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I. Introduction
Some years ago, I described American tort law as a system that reflected “social
moral intuition” with the meting out of appropriate levels of punishment as the dominant
societal understanding of the torts system’s function and purpose.1 My description
sought to explain the discernible trend in both legislation and judicial decisions which
served to curb the movement of the 1960s and 1970s toward strict liability and return tort
law to a fault-based system of law that insisted on finding, at the very least, that the
defendant had been negligent as a condition of imposing liability. What I did not
recognize at the time, however, was that the underlying social moral intuition that drives
the development of tort doctrine was (and is) more complex than a simple fault/no-fault
dichotomy. In fact, it appears there are at least two separate, though often overlapping,
sets of intuitive judgments which are often evident in tort cases. The first deal with the
tort claimant’s conduct and the circumstances under which he or she will be deemed to
have forfeited the right to sue or be seen as disqualified from claiming compensation.
The second deal with the defendant’s conduct and the circumstances under which it is
viewed as fair or otherwise appropriate to require that party to pay.
Moreover, it appears that the social intuition underlying the right to sue and the
obligation to pay has, for the most part, been fairly consistent over a relatively long
period of time. While it is true, of course, that the relative stability of tort law has been
obscured by a series of significant doctrinal changes during the 1960s and 1970s, changes
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during that period do not seem to be indicative of any major shift in the in fundamental
societal understanding of when it is appropriate to sue or be sued.
This claim of relative long-term stability stands in opposition to a widely accepted
understanding of the forces driving what might appear to be a pendulum swing of tort law
back and forth from the late 19th Century and the present. Many holding that view posit
that tort law is a political creature molded by the influence that the business community is
capable of bringing to bear at any given point of time. During the late 19th Century, it is
claimed, tort law was a product of the political clout of the railroads and assorted other
commercial and industrial giants and doctrine was manipulated to minimize potential
liability and thereby maximize profits.2 During much of the 20th Century through the
1960s and 1970s, the country moved away from a commitment to unbridled laissez faire
capitalism toward a system marked by public regulation of business. Corporate rights
waned; state commitment to public welfare grew; and, in the shadow of what appeared to
be the coming of a welfare state, compensation for injury as a means of accomplishing
various instrumentalist goals emerged as the dominant basis for tort law. This was
largely made possible by a widespread popular distain for business interests generally,
and large corporate entities in particular.
As Gary Schwartz explained:
[Consider]…more general features in the public-policy mentality of the
1960s and early 1970s. One feature of public thinking in the 1960s was
that major American corporations—and in particular, the Big Three
automakers—were economic colossi that could easily bear whatever
burdens might be imposed on them by way of regulation or liability. A
second feature of public opinion was that these corporations should not be
held in high respect; indeed, they should be frequently distrusted. When
the steel industry announced price increases that somewhat insidiously
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evaded President Kennedy’s efforts at jawboning, the President was
widely quoted as saying that he now believed what his father had always
told him: “all businessmen [are] sons-of-bitches.” After a dramatic
confrontation, the industry rolled back its prices. During the 1960s, the
consumer movement was gaining force; this movement portrayed innocent
consumers as needing strong protection from manufacturers, which
frequently treat consumers in shabby ways. Ralph Nader's book, Unsafe
at Any Speed, depicted General Motors as a villain for selling Corvairs
with a known tendency to turn out of control. General Motors then
portrayed itself as a foolish and inept villain when it conducted an
investigation of Nader's private life. By the late 1960s, the environmental
movement had begun to gather momentum; and that movement was able
to project the image of major corporations as nasty, insidious polluters.
The willingness of courts by the late 1960s to impose strong liabilities on
major corporations (especially on product manufacturers) was almost
certainly facilitated by this discrediting of corporations that was occurring
in the public outlook.3
In the early 1980s, however, it is claimed that the political right flexed its muscle
again. Beginning with its political ascendancy, marked by Ronald Reagan’s election in
1980, conservative, pro-business politicians appointed like-minded judges with a
resulting reemergence of a business-dominated tort system.4 To the extent that the
business agenda could not be implemented solely through judicial rulemaking in the
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context of common-law litigation, it was necessary for big business to aggressively take
its case to the legislatures. Thus, organizations such as the American Tort Reform
Association, the Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce, all lavishly funded by
various foundations, lobbied Congress and the state legislative bodies seeking change in
tort doctrine.5
The strategy employed by the business community to roll back the pro-plaintiff
tort doctrine that came out of the 1960s and 1970s has been discussed, analyzed and
criticized by many eminent commentators.6 In large part, it is claimed, the strategy has
been to undermine the civil jury system by portraying jurors as either stupid or dishonest
(or both) and bent on pursuing an anti-business agenda. Thus, for example, Jeffrey
Abramson explained the use of the “Hamiltonian narrative.” “Hamiltonianism” he
explained, “is the politics that popularized the slogan, “What's good for General Motors
is good for America.”7
Hamiltonians are the great distributors of stories about the supposed
redistributive instincts of civil jurors, even when evidence suggests
otherwise. Hamiltonians remain sure that jurors: (1) despise the rich,
especially doctors, (2) have it in for big corporations, (3) love to put their
fingers in deep pockets and redistribute other people's money, and (4)
break deadlocks by deciding no harm will be done by holding defendants
liable, since their insurance companies will pick up the tab.
The Hamiltonian story works by finding some “poster boy” to represent
juries out of control. Anecdote is the best vehicle of ridicule and the
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Hamiltonians understand how to use the media’s thirst for the latest scoop
about jurors acquitting Imelda Marcos and then having roast pig with her
at a lavish party that night, or about the jury that confessed that in
calculating its $10.5 billion award to Pennzoil against Texaco it added “$1
billion to the award for each of the Texaco witnesses they had most
despised.” Almost everyone will have heard the tale of how some jury in
New Mexico awarded $2.9 million to a woman burned by McDonald's
coffee. Then there is the one about the woman who sued for loss of her
psychic powers after a CT scan, the prison inmate who sued himself for
violating his own civil rights when he went to prison for twenty years on
burglary convictions, or the West Virginia employee who parlayed a
complaint that she hurt her back opening a pickle jar into a $2.7 billion
award of compensatory and punitive damages. Peter Huber’s articles in
Forbes magazine popularized the term “junk science” to summarize the
way frauds were supposedly driving litigation.8
The foregoing, as a description of the strategy (successfully) employed by a probusiness political movement to alter the tort system, is certainly not inaccurate. It is,
however, incomplete. It is too often assumed that the arguments put forth by the business
community are little more than a cynical manipulation of a gullible public calculated to
maximize profits by enlisting critically important political support from groups which, at
first glance, might seem to be unlikely allies—the lower middle class and conservative
Christian groups.9 Nevertheless, while fostering distrust of the jury may account for the
increasing tendency of the courts to strip the civil jury of power within its traditional
sphere of authority by converting jury questions into rules of law to be determined by the
trial judge or on de novo review by appellate courts,10 the reallocation of the power to
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decide, by itself, does not account for the content of the substantive tort doctrine as it has
been emerging. Moreover, it often fails to explain the specific content of proposed and/or
enacted tort reform legislation. In other words, while we know that the narrative strategy
has been successful, it has not been explained why these narratives of gullible jurors,
greedy plaintiffs and slick lawyers resonate so strongly among members of groups that
would seem to have so little self-interest in the promotion of tort law that restricts their
access to the courts, limits the types of claims that they may assert, and reduces the
amount of compensation that may be recovered.
In this Article, I will attempt to identify the values reflected in post-1970s tort
doctrine and, more importantly, demonstrate that, for the most part, the doctrinal changes,
limitations and restrictions are largely consistent with long-standing social perceptions
regarding how people ought to behave.11 In other words, to recast an old cliché, ATRA
and its allies are preaching to the choir.
There is one additional factor, though the extent of its significance cannot really
be assessed without empirical study. Nevertheless, the ongoing influence exercised by
conservative Christianity both before and after the 1960s and 1970s appears to be more
important than is generally recognized.
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The connection between conservative Christian theology and tort reform may
seem, at first glance, to be tenuous at best. When an internet search of “tort reform”
turned up numerous articles advocating reform published on sites that also focused on
abortion, the death penalty, gay marriage, school prayer, creationism and other more
obvious matters of concern to the religious right,12 I assumed that I was seeing the
product of a political coalition of convenience between big business and conservative
Christians. In return for support of tax cuts, tort reform and similar economic issues
which big business had an interest in promoting, conservative Christians got businesses’
support for their political agenda promoting moral issues and together elected first
Ronald Reagan and later George W. Bush. In fact, however, my assumption was overly
simplistic.
Conservative Christians (or at least some groups falling under that label) have
long been committed to a libertarian, free market philosophy that, in effect, became an
essential part of their theology.13 As Michael Lienesch explains:
Christian conservatives are Christian capitalists. In constructing their
economic thinking, they borrow heavily from secular conservative
writings, which they cite and combine in a seemingly unsystematic way.
The writers they refer to most frequently include libertarians of the
Austrian school of Friedrich A. Hayek and Ludwig von Mises,
neoconservative economic thinkers such as Michael Novak, and the
supply-side capitalists of the New Right, especially George Gilder. To
these secular sources they add their own theological tenets and apply their
own moral models, drawing especially on the examples of late-nineteenth12

See e.g. Samuel Gregg, Tort Reform and Thomas More: Lessons from a Christian Lawyer,
http://www.acton.org/ppolicy/comment/article.php?id=216 (Sept. 8, 2004); Jordan Ballor, Touting Tort
Reform, http://www.acton.org/ppolicy/comment/article.php?id=189 (March 24, 2004); Ronald J. Rychlak,
Tort Reform as a Moral Issue, http://www.acton.org/ppolicy/comment/article.php?id=258 (April 6, 2005).
13

See C. Boyden Gray, The Republicans’ Common Heritage, 13 The World & I 88 (1998)(asserting the
existence of a “common heritage of free-market economic thought as expressed by the classical liberalism
of the nineteenth century and the fundamentalist mots of today’s evangelicals, which have the origins in the
religious and political struggles of early nineteenth-century England.”).

8
century Christian capitalists like J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockerfeller,
along with entrepreneurs and small businessmen from more recent times.
The result is a complicated conception of capitalism defined as a Godgiven system, “part of God’s plan,” as Jerry Falwell puts it, “for His
people.”14
Perhaps more importantly, the Christian/libertarian link has a long history in
America. As Phillip Hammond explained, during the early 19th Century “individualistic
evangelicalism” became “the dominant religious perspective in America.”15 While this
religion also championed the abolition of slavery,
no doubt more widespread…was the element in evangelicalism that
contributed to its subsequent conservatism: the “paradoxical combination
of libertarianism and traditionalism.” Developing throughout the century
along with the American nation, this element became as close to an
established theology—with a parallel moral consensus—as America will
ever know. In the nineteenth century it motivated missionaries to build
schools and cover native breasts. It encouraged capitalists to build
factories and hedge their investments with philanthropy. It exalted rural
and small-town ideals, saturating America with the idea that people should
be free to do pretty much as they like, as long as they look out for
themselves—and, of course, behave.16
Following the Civil War, there was a liberal-conservative split within American
Protestantism—the modernists against the fundamentalists.17 By the 1920s, it was clear
that modernists’ beliefs were ascendant.18 By the late 1950s,
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the overlap of liberal Protestantism with modern, liberal culture was
nearly complete. Churches absorbed the New Deal ethic along with the
belief that government agencies are the proper way to address social
problems. Ecumenism was espoused, denominational loyalty becoming
simply a matter of stylistic preference. Civil rights, world peace,
redistributed wealth and control of nuclear arms became other planks in
liberal Protestantism’s agenda.19
Nevertheless, during the period between the 1920s and the 1970s the
fundamentalists did not simply disappear and, by the 1970s, the confluence of a number
of events led to their very public reemergence. First, technology allowed the
fundamentalists to publicly air their message to large numbers of people. Second, the
televangelists had the excesses of the 1960s to illustrate how things worked out when the
liberals were in control. Third, the economic downturn during the 1970s necessitated
cuts in public spending. Again, Phillip Hammond explained:
[W]hat made evangelical Protestantism an attractive response to the events
in the 1970s? James Hunter, in his splendid analysis American
Evangelicals, provides the single most important clue. It is true, he points
out, that conservative Protestants lost the theological battle after 1920, but
the moral viewpoint they shared at the time with most other American
continued to be the dominant conventional viewpoint until the 1960s. It
was one thing to lose control of the major denominations…, but quite
another to see all of American culture threatening to deviate from
the…conventionality inherited from the nineteenth century. * * *
the refutation of higher criticism), other Christian doctrines (the existence of God, the
historicality of Christ, and the nature of the Christian life), commentary on the need for
missions and evangelism, and finally, refutations of other religious systems (including
Mormonism, Christian Science, spiritualism and Roman Catholicism). Though The
Fundamentals was widely dispersed among church leaders, it was generally ignored by
the academic and scholarly community. Its net accomplishment of its stated goals was
dubious; at best, it provided a pause in the trend toward the decline of conservative power
in the denominations.”
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[In addition to the counterculture of the 1960s, the women’s
movement, affirmative action for minorities, gay rights, unwed mothers,
and “court decisions declaring abortion to be right and school prayer
wrong”], the 1970s saw a “halt to economic growth, the retracting of an
economy that had been chiefly expanding for decades. This factor had
impact throughout the social structure, of course; but if government
programs to enhance life had to be curtailed, if civil rights—of criminals,
for example—were going to be restricted, then a certain comfort might be
derived from seeing these not as failure of an idealistic agenda but as
ideologically demanded.”20
In short, the Christian right has long been largely committed to a libertarian view
of personal responsibility, contract rights, property rights and free market capitalism in
addition to a very literal reading of the bible. More importantly, perhaps, their views on
both economic and moral issues have been and still are widely shared. This is true
whether the underlying issue is motivation in suing, e.g. charges of greed, or whether it is
acceptance of personal responsibility, or whether it is the determination of the extent of
an actor’s culpability and the appropriateness of the resulting consequences.
II. The Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Sue
A. The Background Context
By “right to sue,” I do not refer to an inalienable, fundamental legal claim of
entitlement. In fact, the existence of such a “right,” in an absolute sense, has been denied
by the federal courts in its entirety21 and by a majority of state courts as well. Only a
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handful of states have asserted the existence of such a right under state constitutional law
and, even in those states, the right is not deemed to be a fundamental one and thus can be
modified or even abrogated in its entirety by the legislature at least under some set of
circumstances.22 Instead, I deal only with factors that influence broad public perception
that one is or is not violating societal or group norms of behavior by seeking to assign the
responsibility for one’s misfortune to another.23
The perception must be understood against the background of a generally
recognized norm against litigation.24 Public skepticism regarding claims of entitlement to
demand money from others25 has served to create something of a presumption against tort
claimants. To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff needs to be viewed as relatively
blameless. In a rough, imprecise sense, the situation is analogous to the equitable clean
hands doctrine—that the courts (and society generally) should not be aiding those whose
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wrongdoing created the state of affairs from which they now seek redress.26 Perhaps
more importantly, one’s decision to sue cannot be perceived as violating one or more of a
whole series of social norms of behavior—the decision cannot make one appear to be
acting dishonorably by reneging on a freely made prior agreement (actual or tacit). The
decision cannot appear to be motivated by greed; it cannot be perceived to display
ingratitude; it cannot be perceived as an abrogation of personal responsibility or an
attempt to blame another for one’s own shortcomings or failures. Finally, of course, the
claim must sound objectively genuine.27
1. Norms Against Litigation
a. In General
Although it is commonly asserted that Americans are excessively litigious, most
of the empirical evidence and serious academic study of the subject lead one to conclude
that, in truth, most tortiously inflicted injuries do not result in litigation.28 This remains
true even if one excludes injuries caused under circumstances where the existence of a
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cause of action is not recognized by the victim and/or where the decision not to pursue
litigation is economically rational, i.e. where the injury is too small to justify the cost of
litigation.
The most compelling explanation for this fact is the existence of a social norm
against litigation that serves to deter individuals from filing suit to redress legally
compensable harm.29 Various rationales rooted in economics, sociology, psychology,
and so on, have been suggested. Thus, it has been posited that declining to assert a legal
claim might be a way to publicly announce one’s wealth—signaling to others that “I
don’t need the money.”30 Alternatively, if society perceives the negotiation of disputes as
a value, one might decline to sue lest one be perceived as rejecting that value and creating
disharmony within the group.31 It has also been suggested that, if people tend to be
overly optimistic about their own chances for success in the face of uncertainty, an
economically inefficient level of litigation might result. The norm against litigation, it is
asserted, might serve to counteract such a tendency toward inefficient behavior.32
Though there appears to be little or no literature directly on point, one might also
consider the possibility that many people are simply intimidated by the court system.
Lawsuits require one to enter a foreign land populated by frightening robed and suited
29
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creatures speaking a language that is not quite English. Trial requires one to speak in
public and subject oneself to public judgment. Although under the American rule, an
unsuccessful litigant need not pay the other’s attorney fees, it is not clear how widely this
is known by the public and, in any event, the fear of expending large sums on other
litigation costs may serve as a deterrent.33 Additionally, by definition, lawsuits are
confrontational. One must often challenge authority or powerful entities and the prospect
of doing so may be daunting. If this is the case, many of the reasons given for refusing to
sue—plaintiffs are greedy, I don’t need the money, forgiveness is a virtue, etc., may
simply represent rationalizations for declining to do something which one is secretly
afraid to do.
b. The Religious Right
The post-1960s reemergence of evangelical Christianity as a significant, vocal
political force in America added a new dimension, or at least a new level of power, to a
view that initiating lawsuits is improper. The arguments advanced by the religious right
fall into two general categories. First, when disputes arise that cannot be resolved
directly between the parties to the dispute, the aggrieved party should take the dispute to
the church, rather than the secular authorities. Ronald Rychlak explains:
For Christians, the picture of properly functioning social structures is
described in part by the apostle Paul…. Paul raises several
possibilities…within the context of church discipline, including especially
the commendation of the ecclesial adjudication of disputes rather than
33
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resorting to litigation in secular courts. He even praises the idea that it
might be better for a Christian to forego legal action altogether rather than
take his case to the civil courts. *** This is not to say that the civil courts
are superfluous, but rather points to a greater principle: that community,
forgiveness, and reconciliation ought to be higher priorities for Christians
than material compensation.
***
And so Christians can be powerful witnesses to the word through living in
a community of forgiveness. Consider the possibilities if it were a
widespread practice among Christians to avoid at all costs the pursuit of
tort litigation in lieu of a variety of other options. These alternative
courses of redress include personal forgiveness and reconciliation,
ecclesiastically facilitated mediation, private third-party conflict
resolution, or even self-initiated restitution.34
Rychlak goes on to point out the existence of and suggest the use of “Christian
non-profit organizations that are dedicated to the private resolution of civil disputes.”35
And, in fact, a number of such groups maintain websites on which they offer to provide
training seminars and materials that can be used for dispute resolution wholly within the
context of the religious community.36
The second category of argument made by conservative Christian groups deals
with why one should not bring suit, as distinct from the first which dictates who is to
adjudicate disputes. Briefly, the claim is that the initiation of litigation demonstrates
“emotions that are manifested as greed, enmity, unwillingness to forgive, retaliation, and
envy…[which] alienate us not only from God but also from each other.”37 Moreover,
demanding that the wrongdoer pay compensation within the context of a system that is

34

Ronald J. Rychlak, Trial by Fury 72-73 (2004).

35

Id. at 73.

36

See e.g. http://www.icorvi.org/overview.php maintained by Icorvi Ministries.

37

Rychlak, supra note 34 at 70.

16
coercive strips the wrongdoer of the ability (and perhaps desire) to voluntarily elect to
right the wrong that was committed, or at least feel the appropriate level of remorse.38
B. Disqualifying Factors
Under some circumstances, there is a widespread perception that an injured
person ought not to be able to bring suit despite the fact that the defendant’s conduct is
such that, under other circumstances, it would meet the applicable standard for the
imposition of liability. In most of these cases, though not all, the circumstances are such
that filing suit is amenable to an interpretation that the plaintiff is being greedy and/or is,
in some sense, refusing to accept personal responsibility in attempting to cast blame on
another, although other values may be implicated as well. As noted earlier, such a
perception may be found: (1) where the plaintiff appears to be reneging on a freely made
antecedent agreement; (2) where the plaintiff’s decision to file suit appears to display a
lack of gratitude; (3) where the plaintiff appears to be overreacting when judged under an
objective standard, and (4) where the plaintiff’s culpability seems disproportionately
great relative to the defendant’s culpability.
In this context, it is worth noting that the particular analytical convention
employed by a court or legislature to preclude suit is often far less telling than the result.
Thus, whether the plaintiff is barred by his or her own contributory or comparative
negligence, or that same conduct is found to be a superseding cause, or barred by a noduty rule, does not matter as long as the same social perception of forfeiture of rights or
disqualification from suing is being expressed. In fact, it is not at all uncommon for the
mode of judicial analysis to be tailored to make the result possible given other analytical

38

Id. at 5. Also see Bayern, supra note 24 at 1714-16 (discussing explanations for the norm against
litigation that are based on religious or moral grounds).
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constraints. Thus, for example, if a legislature within a jurisdiction has adopted a rule of
pure comparative negligence, the only way to deny recovery in its entirety might be to
decide the case on the basis of “no-duty” or proximate cause.39
1. Pre-Injury Agreement not to Sue
a. Consent – Express Agreement
If one who is about to engage in some activity expressly agrees in advance that he
or she will not hold the defendant liable should things turn out badly, it is relatively easy
to argue that reneging on the agreement evidences some type of greed, dishonesty or
dishonorable behavior that should not be tolerated, let alone rewarded. Of course, the
existence of such a perception may well depend on the perceived fairness of the
agreement itself—whether it was entered into under circumstances where there was
meaningful choice, whether the plaintiff understood the risks involved and whether the
prevailing view at the time places a greater premium on the sanctity of private agreement
or on rights that arise irrespective of agreement.
During the most of the late 19th and 20th Centuries, courts routinely refused to
uphold such agreements where it was clear “that the effect of the contract [was]…to put
[the plaintiff]…at the mercy of the other’s negligence.”40 Thus, for example, in Westlye

39

The judicial strategy of formulating doctrine that, in a purely formalistic sense, is not in conflict with
other judicially formulated rules or legislative enactment is not confined to judges with any particular
ideological agenda. For example, in Spier v. Barker, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974), the New
York court dealt with plaintiff misconduct as a failure to mitigate damages and thereby avoided holding
that no recovery was possible under the state’s rule of contributory negligence. Courts have also given the
“ultimate outcome” instruction to juries under various circumstances to circumvent legislation that would
have required a particular result. See Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury’s Role as Finder of Fact, 20
Ga. L. Rev. 123, 164-66 (1985)(criticizing the practice).
40

Prosser & Keeton, supra note 26, § 68, at 482.
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v. Look Sports, Inc.41 the court explained that an invalid release contained certain
characteristics, namely:
“It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public
regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of
practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public
who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established
standards. As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the
economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation
possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member
of the public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining
power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract
of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay
additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence.
Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the
purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risks of
carelessness by the seller or his agents.”42
In other cases, however, where the activity in question was one in which the
plaintiff desired to participate, but had no particular need for, typically some dangerous
recreational activity, a release or covenant not to sue would be upheld.43 Exculpatory
agreements also were upheld in cases involving commercial actors based on the
underlying assumption that they were free to allocate the risk of loss in commercial
transactions however they saw fit.44

41

22 Cal. Rptr.2d 781 (Cal. App. 1993).

42

Id. at 790 (quoting Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37 (Cal. 1962)).
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See e.g. Kirashige v. Indian Dunes, Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 310, 315 (Cal. App. 1988)(dirt bike racing);
Curtis v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 299 F.Supp.2d 777, 781 (N.D.Ohio 2004)(Ohio law)(stock car
racing); Johnson v. Paraplane Corp., 460 S.E.2d 398, 402 (S.C. App. 1995)(ultra light aircraft rental).

44

See e.g. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1974)(Cal.
law)(disclaimer between commercial parties upheld). Also see Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider, 158
S.W.3d 78, 85 (Tex. App. 2005)(holding that the enforceability of an “as is” cause in a commercial lease of
realty depended upon “(1) the sophistication of the parties, (2) the terms of the “as is” agreement, (3)
whether the “as is” agreement was freely negotiated, (4) whether the agreement was an arm’s length
transaction, and (5) whether there was a knowing misrepresentation or concealment of a known fact.”).
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Following the development of strict liability for defective products in the 1960s,
however, courts displayed a reluctance to apply the same rules that were developed in
negligence cases. Perhaps because strict liability in tort was largely developed to provide
a basis of liability free from the contractual restrictions that had often precluded recovery
under warranty law, courts were unwilling to recognize the validity of contractual
releases even when the plaintiff freely and voluntarily entered the agreement.45
The adoption of the Products Liability Restatement in 1998, however, may reflect
the beginnings of a move to bring products cases into conformity with negligence law
generally. It takes the position that such disclaimers are only presumptively invalid,
recognizing the possibility that the presumption might be overcome.46
Interestingly, the idea that prior agreement may preclude the assertion of a tort
claim has been expanded by some courts to preclude suit—even in the absence of
evidence of actual or apparent consent by the victim to bear the risk of harm arising out

45

See Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 781, 799-800 (Cal. App. 1993)(holding that it would
violate public policy to honor disclaimers in products cases based on strict liability).
46

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 18, cmt. d (1998) states that:
The rule in this Section applies to cases in which commercial product sellers attempt
unfairly to disclaim or otherwise limit their liability to the majority of users and
consumers who are presumed to lack information and bargaining power adequate to
protect their interests. This Section does not address whether consumers, especially when
represented by informed and economically powerful consumer groups or intermediaries,
with full information and sufficient bargaining power, may contract with product sellers
to accept curtailment of liability in exchange for concomitant benefits, or whether such
consumers might be allowed to agree to substitute alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms in place of traditional adjudication. When such contracts are accompanied
by alternative nontort remedies that serve as an adequate quid pro quo for reducing or
eliminating rights to recover in tort, arguments may support giving effect to such
agreements. Such contractual arrangements raise policy questions different from those
raised by this Section and require careful consideration by the courts.

Also see McGraw-Edison Co. v. Northeastern Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 678 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (Ind.
1997)(strict liability statute might be overcome “[i]f true negotiation of risk allocation occurs, and specific
language is used, or proof of knowing assumption of risk is offered….”)(dictum).
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of a given transaction—in those cases where there was only the theoretical opportunity to
allocate the risk of harm prior to the occurrence. Thus, in the so-called “economic loss”
cases, there is a body of authority that commercial actors who can be seen to have had a
relatively equal bargaining position prior to the loss-causing event must allocate the risk
contractually, rather than look to tort law for recovery.47
While the rule seems intuitively defensible in transactions between commercial
equals in cases involving economic loss, some courts, apparently intent on enacting tort
reform from the bench,48 have expanded its applicability to consumer transactions,49 and
claims involving foreseeable property damage in addition to pure economic loss.50 Of
course, whether these decisions will prove to be consistent with existing moral social
intuition regarding the right to sue remains to be seen
b. Primary Voluntary Assumption of Risk
Traditionally, a plaintiff’s voluntary assumption of risk was established by
showing that a plaintiff subjectively knew of and appreciated the nature and extent of risk
created by the defendant’s conduct and, with such knowledge and appreciation,
voluntarily elected to confront the risk. Though commonly designated a “defense,” with
the burden of pleading and proof on the defendant, historically, it has been rather

47

See e.g. Chemitrol Adhesives, Inc. v. American Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 624, 631
(Ohio 1989).
48

Discussing the issue of judicial tort reform, see generally, Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court
Tort Reform: Limiting State Power to Articulate and Develop Tort Law—Defamation, Preemption, and
Punitive Damages, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1189 (2006); Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38
Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1093 (2005).
49

See e.g. Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 673-74 (3rd Cir. 2002)(predicting PA law).

50

See e.g. Palmetto Linen Service, Inc. v. U.N.X., Inc., 205 F.3d 126, 129-30 (4th Cir. 2000)(S.C. law).
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common either to treat it as a “duty” issue to be decided by the court as a matter of law,51
or decided by the court as a factual issue upon which reasonable people could not
disagree.52
Originally, the doctrine was clearly distinct from contributory negligence.
Whereas the latter required the plaintiff to have behaved in an unreasonable manner, the
former did not deal with reasonableness, but simple subjective consent to confront a
known risk, whether such decision was objectively reasonable or not. The Second
Restatement of Torts, however, initiated a major change to the traditional understanding
of assumption of risk. Comment n to section 402A provides, in part, as follows:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defects in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. One the other
hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of risk is a defense under this
Section….53
By adding the requirement that one “unreasonably” encounter the danger, the
Restatement blurred the distinction between voluntary assumption of risk and
contributory negligence and many courts followed suit. From the addition of a
“reasonableness” element, it was only a short hop toward the elimination of assumption
of risk as a distinct doctrine. Many courts reasoned that if one reasonably encountered a

51

See e.g. Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 351 (Minn. 1979)(explaining that “[t]he doctrine of
primary assumption of the risk technically is not a defense, but rather a legal theory which relieves a
defendant of the duty which he might otherwise owe to the plaintiff with respect to particular risks.”).
52

See e.g. Benjamin v. Benjamin, 439 N.W.2d 527, 529 (N.D. 1989)(concluding that the plaintiff “knew
that protective eyewear was available and he should have been wearing it. Reasonable people cannot
disagree that… [the plaintiff] was fully aware of the dangers involved in not using eye protection and, in
failing to use such protection…assumed the risk of injury.”).
53

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, cmt. n (1965)(emphasis added).
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risk—running into a burning building to save a child, for example—such conduct should
not preclude recovery.54 On the other hand, if one unreasonably encountered a risk, such
conduct would already be a defense under the rapidly emerging doctrine of comparative
negligence. Therefore, courts proclaimed, there was no need to continue to recognize
assumption of risk as a separate defense—it was simply subsumed by comparative
negligence.55
More recently, however, the doctrine has reemerged as a “no-duty” rule under the
title of “primary assumption of risk.” Although sometimes the phrase is used to describe
express (contractual) assumption of risk,56 some court have resurrected an implied
version to bar recovery by persons who are injured in the course of confronting risks
which are inherent in their chosen occupation or in particular activities in which they
have elected to engage. Moreover, courts taking this position do so by finding, as a
matter of law, no duty was owed to the plaintiff. Thus, no duty has been found to boxers
injured in the course of a fight,57 jockeys thrown from their mounts,58 participants in non-
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See Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1977).
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Id. at 292. Also see Fell v. Zimath, 575 A.2d 267, 268 (Del. Super. 1989); Salinas v. Vierstra, 695 P.2d
369, 374 (Idaho 1985); Barrett v. Fritz, 248 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ill. 1969); Rosenan v. City of Esterville, 199
N.W.2d 125, 131 (Iowa 1972); Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Ky. 1967); Murray v. Ramada
Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1125 (La. 1988); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 402 (Me. 1976); Felguer v.
Anderson, 133 N.W.2d 136, 153 (Mich. 1965); Boldac v. Crain, 181 A.2d 641, 644 (N.H. 1962); Meistrich
v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 95-96 (N.J. 1959); Williamson v. Smith, 491 P.2d 1147,
1152 (N.M. 1971); Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101, 104-05 (N.D. 1974); Perez v. McConkey, 872
S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tenn. 1994); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 520 (Tex. 1978); Sunday v.
Stratton Corp., 390 A.2d 398, 402-03 (Vt. 1978); Davis v. Globe Machine Mfg. Col, 684 P.2d 692, 697
(Wash. 1984).
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See e.g. Mahoney v. USA Hockey, Inc. 77 F.Supp.2d 859, 872 (N.D.Ohio 1999)(Ohio law)(contractual
assumption of risk is a species of primary assumption of risk), rev’d in part on other grounds, 5 Fed. Appx.
450 (6th Cir. 2001).
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Estate of Foronda v. Hawaii International Boxing Club, 25 P.3d 826, 836 (Haw. App. 2001).
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Turcotte v. Fell, 474 N.Y.S.2d 893, 897 (N.Y.Sup. 1984).
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contact or low-contact recreational activities,59 veterinarian assistants bitten by dogs60
and, of course, firefighters and other similar professional danger-confronters injured in
the course of pursuing their professions.61
Assumption of risk as a matter of law has been resurrected in other contexts as
well. For many years courts routinely applied the “patent danger rule” in cases where a
negligently designed product caused injury to the user. Under the patent danger rule,
product manufacturers were found only to have a duty to avoid designing a product that
contained a hidden danger. As long as the dangerous quality of the product was open and
obvious, the manufacturer was not negligent as a matter of law.62 Thus, there could be no
suit if one was injured while using a machine that lacked a safety guard to shield blades
or exposed moving parts, for example, since the danger of such a design was obvious to
the user.
Primarily during the 1970s, the patent danger rule fell into judicial disfavor as
courts recognized that, under a simple cost-benefit analysis, the addition of safety
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Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 591, 593 (Cal. App. 1997)(holding that golf falls within the meaning of
a sporting activity subject to primary assumption of risk because “[h]itting a golf ball at a high rate of speed
involves the very real possibility that the ball will take flight in an unintended direction. If every ball
behaved as the golfer wished, there would be little ‘sport’ in the sport of golf.”); Vecchione v. Middle
Country Central School District, 752 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (App. Div. 2002)(slip and fall during tennis practice
was an assumed risk);
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Nelson v. Hall, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668, 672 (Cal. App. 1985).
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Beyond police and firefighters, precisely who will be barred by the “firefighters’ rule” is a matter of
some debate. Compare Whiting v. Central Trux & Parts, Inc., 984 F.Supp. 1096, 1106 (E.D.Mich.1997)
(holding that the fireman's rule barred recovery by a customs inspector who was injured by a falling truck
hood while inspecting a truck entering the country since “Whiting’s job is not distinguishable enough from
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See e.g. Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 803 (N.Y. 1950), overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348
N.E.2d 571, 576 (N.Y. 1976).
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features was frequently cost-justified in light of the “inevitable” injuries that would occur
if such features were not provided. Thus, in negligence cases, all states now purport to
reject the rule in its original form, with the sole exception of North Carolina.63
This is not to say, however, that the issue has been put to rest. In failure-to-warn
cases, courts routinely hold there is no duty to warn of obvious dangers apart from the
question of whether the failure to warn was a causal factor in bringing about the
plaintiff’s harm.64 Furthermore, the patent danger rule has reappeared in design cases.65
Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts provided for strict liability for
commercial sellers of products which, when sold, were in a “defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer….”66 Both comments g (“Defective
Condition”) and i (“Unreasonably Dangerous”) define those terms by using a consumer
expectation test, i.e. whether the product was in a condition that presented a level of
danger that would have been expected by an ordinary consumer.67
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See McCollum v. Grove Mfg. Co., 293 S.E.2d 632, 635 (N.C. App. 1982)(retaining the rule).
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See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 2, cmt. j (1998)(stating “[i]n general, a product
seller is not subject to liability for failing to warn or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance measures
that should be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable product users. When a risk is obvious or
generally known, the prospective addressee of a warning will or should already know of its existence.”);
Also see Burke v. Spartanics Ltd., 252 F.3d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2001)(N.Y. law)(distinguishing the duty
and causation issues raised by the obviousness of the danger).
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In addition to product design cases, similar principles may be applied in building design cases. Thus, for
example, in Pickens v. Tulsa Metropolitan Ministry, 951 P.2d 1079 (Okla. 1997), the plaintiff, who had
been sleeping on a retaining wall, sustained injuries when he fell off. His suit against the building owner
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965).

Id. Comment i provides, in part, that: “[t]he rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is,
at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him.” Comment g provides, in part, that: “[t]he article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.”
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Although many states have simply rejected the consumer expectation test in its
entirety, some have retained it either as the sole test of “defectiveness” or, more
commonly, as an alternative test to be used under some circumstances.68 Some
applications of the consumer expectation test, particularly if determined as a matter of
law, are simply the patent danger rule under a new name.69 Thus, for example, in Todd v.
Societe BIC, S.A.,70 the Seventh Circuit held that a disposable lighter that lacked a childproof safety feature was not, as a matter of law, defective, regardless of whether the
manufacturer could have added such a feature at a minimal cost. Predicting Illinois law,
the court concluded: “the Illinois Supreme Court would not apply the risk-utility test to a
simple but obviously dangerous product. An ordinary disposable lighter is such a
product. Therefore, the district court was correct to determine that such a lighter is
obviously dangerous, but not unreasonably dangerous, without reference to the riskutility test.”71
Rather obviously, both the express and implied assumption of risk cases are
amenable to a number of interpretations which are not, in the final analysis, in any sense
68

See generally, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Reporters’ Notes to § 2
(1998)(collecting and discussing cases and articles).
69

See Aaron D. Twersky, In Defense of the Products Liability Restatement: Part I, 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 27, 32 (1998)(explaining that “the problem with the consumer expectations test is that it provides
backdoor entry for the patent danger rule. The patent danger rule says that if a danger is open and obvious,
that is, if consumers can expect the danger, the product is not defective. If you say that your test is a
consumers' expectations test, what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If a product is defective
because it doesn't meet consumer expectations, then for the most part you have to expect the courts are
going to say, it’s not defective if it meets consumer expectations. But that’s just a backdoor way of saying
that the patent danger rule governs in product design cases. The patent danger rule is simply wrong. An
industrial machine that is unguarded at the point of operation has dangers that are open and obvious. If it’s
reasonable to put a safety guard there, that case ought not to be barred merely because the danger is
obvious.”).
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21 F.3d 1402 (7th Cir. 1994)(Ill. law), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 947.
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Id. at 1412.
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mutually exclusive of one another. Certainly, by deciding the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover as a matter of law, the courts display distrust of the civil jury.72 Moreover, there
is clearly a pro-defendant/pro-business flavor throughout the cases.73 It is more
important for our purposes, however, to recognize the power of the decisions lies in the
very strong, though largely intuitive, appeal of the voluntary assumption of risk doctrine.
The doctrine’s appeal is rooted in the sense that the plaintiffs are asking for money even
though, by word or by act, they previously represented that they would not. In reneging
on their promise, albeit implicit, they open themselves up to a charge of greed or
dishonorable behavior in some sense. At the very least, the bringing of a lawsuit may be
interpreted as a refusal to accept personal responsibility for the consequences of one’s
own decisions, and the insistence on the importance of personal responsibility is one of
the defining features of conservative Christianity.74 In order to conform tort doctrine to
social moral intuition, some courts have reached back and seized upon doctrine that predated the liberalization of tort law in the 1960s and 1970s and breathed new life into it.
This would not be found acceptable if the values underlying the doctrine’s application
were not widely held and if they had not remained constant over time.
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See All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1999)(asserting that tort law
lacks “screens against the vagaries of the jury.”).
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See e.g. Werwinski, supra note 49 at 680-81 (expressing reluctance to adopt rules that would expose
“manufacturers to substantially greater liability.”).
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See Lienesch, supra note 14 at 98 (“According to [Amway Corp. President and director of the Christian
Freedom Foundation, Richard] DeVos, accountability requires personal responsibility, ‘the demand that
each individual takes full responsibility for his choices and actions, the willingness to accept the rewards or
punishments that follow as natural consequences of his behavior.’”).
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2. Lack of Gratitude
As I discussed at some length years ago, there is a rather clear connection
between a defendant’s economic motivation underlying an activity and the sense of the
plaintiff’s entitlement to sue if injured by negligence committed in the course of that
profit-seeking activity.75 Thus, traditional tort principles imposed a duty on common
carriers, innkeepers, invitors and others whose conduct was profit-seeking.
The flip side of this traditional view was the creation of immunities favoring
altruists or those perceived to be motivated by altruism. Sometimes the immunities were
created by common-law judicial rulemaking and sometimes by legislative enactment. In
either case, the immunities seemed to reflect a very real social consensus that there was
something unseemly in the conduct of accepting a gift and then turning around to sue the
donor.76
Converting this view into tort doctrine, legislatures during the 1920s and 1930s
enacted automobile guest passenger legislation precluding suit by the passenger who
accepted a ride in cases where the driver’s conduct was “merely” negligent.77 Much
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Martin A. Kotler, Motivation and Tort Law: Acting for Economic Gain as a Suspect Motive, 41 Vand. L.
Rev. 63 (1988).
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This view tends to fit with the conservative Christian conception. See Liensch, supra note 14 at 129
(asserting that “[r]eligious conservatives see charity as a reciprocal relationship in which both giver and
receiver have responsibilities to one another. In the case of recipients, they are expected not only to be
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standards of the Kingdom is required…responsibility must be enforced.’”).
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Prosser & Keeton, supra note 26, § 34, 215-17.
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along the same lines, Good Samaritan law protected physicians and other health care
professionals who came to the victim’s rescue.78
The old charitable immunity doctrine, however, was perhaps the clearest
illustration of the idea. Although there were numerous variations on the doctrine, in
essence, it was a judicially created rule that immunized charitable hospitals and the like
from suit by those to whom services were negligently provided. By the 1950s, however,
the obvious unfairness of the rule—not to mention its blatant discriminatory impact on
the economically disadvantaged—led to its judicial rejection in a majority of states.79
Nevertheless, the desire to continue to provide protection for the altruist remains
evident. The federal Volunteer Protection Act of 199780 immunizes volunteers at
nonprofit organizations from personal tort liability.81 Under North Carolina law, those
who donate food to nonprofits are immune from liability based on negligence,82 as are the
nonprofits themselves.83 A couple of states have enacted legislation capping the damages
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See generally, Eric A. Brandt, Note, Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A Current Analysis, 17
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adopted some form of Good Samaritan legislation.”).
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See e.g. Bing v. Thunig, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957)(concluding that “[t]he rule of nonliability is out of
tune with the life about us, at variance with modern-day needs and with concepts of justice and fair dealing.
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N.C. Gen. Stats. § 99B-10(b).
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available against nonprofits84 and some states continue to recognize some variation of the
old charitable immunity doctrine.85
3. Claim Does Not Meet Objective Standard
Largely based on the belief that courts could not distinguish between fraudulent
and genuine claims of emotional distress, there had long been a refusal to recognize a
cause of action for negligent (or for that matter intentional) infliction of emotional
distress in cases where the distress was not a consequence of physical injury. While
eventually most jurisdictions eliminated their complete bar to such claims, various special
rules were instituted to provide some assurance that the plaintiff was actually suffering
from the distress alleged. Thus, as all first-year law students learn, special tort rules—the
“impact rule,” “zone of danger rule,” and/or “physical manifestation” requirements—
were developed in the so-called “direct infliction” cases, while, in the by-stander cases,
the “zone of danger rule” or “three proximities test” was used.86
In 1980, however, perhaps under the belief that the field of psychiatry had
advanced to the point where fraudulent claims could be detected,87 California rejected the
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Mass. Gen. L. Ann. 231 § 85k (1987)($20,000 cap); Tex. Health & Safety Code § 311.0456 (2005) and
Tex. Civ. Pract. & Rem. Code § 101.023 (1997)($250,000 per person).
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Low v. Insurance Co. of North America, 2005 WL 343667 (Ark. 2006); Harrell v. Louis Smith
Memorial Hosp., 397 S.E.2d 746, 750 (Ga. App. 1990); Abraham v. Reiss, 638 A.2d 743, 748 (Md. 1994);
N.C.G.S.A. § 1-539.10 (2005); N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-7 (1995); Coulombe v. Salvation Army, 790 A.2d 593,
595-96 (Me. 2002); Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 309 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ohio 1974); Ola v.
YMCA of South Hampton Roads, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 70, 72 (Va. 2005); Tex. Civ. Pract. & Rem. Code §§
84.001-.008 (2003).
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See generally, Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, §§ 308-09, 835-41 (2000).

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (Cal. 1980)(asserting “that medical
science and particularly the field of mental health have made much progress in the 20th century is
manifest….”); Also see generally, Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 115, 135-36 (1993)(citing the reluctance to permit emotional distress claims as “[a]nother
reflection of tort law's coolness to psychiatry and psychology….”)
.
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idea that special tort limitations were necessary in the direct infliction emotional distress
cases and, in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, permitted recovery for negligently
inflicted emotional distress in the absence of physical consequences and under
circumstances where application of any of the other tests would have made no sense.88
Only thirteen years later, in Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,89 a very
different California Supreme Court backed away from Molien and, in a case where four
land owners who were exposed to carcinogens and other toxic substances that the
defendant negligently permitted to contaminate their water, held that the plaintiffs’
emotional distress based on the fear of contracting cancer in the future was not
compensable unless they could show contracting the disease was more likely than not to
occur.90 Other states went further and simply held such claims were not actionable at all
in the absence of physical harm.91 The fact that California and other states that followed
its lead have now retreated from the apparent liberalization of tort law in this area has
been cited as an illustration of how changing politics and new judicial appointments
resulted in the in the conservative shift of legal doctrine.92
Again, however, that explanation may oversimplify matters. To understand more
fully what has occurred in this field some distinctions need to be made. In Molien, the
plaintiff’s wife was negligently diagnosed by Kaiser physicians; wrongly told she was
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Id. at 571.
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See e.g. Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. App. 1987); Capital Holding Corp. v.
Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ky. 1994); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 238 (Pa. 1996).
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suffering from a sexually transmitted disease; and told to inform her husband. This led to
mutual accusations of infidelity and, eventually, to divorce.93

The plaintiff sought

recovery for the expenses of marital counseling incurred before the break up and
damages for his emotional distress, even though he displayed no physical manifestation
of the distress.94 In other words, given the facts surrounding the claim, there was neither
any hint of subjective dishonesty on the plaintiff’s part and, perhaps more importantly,
under an objective test, it was clear that virtually anybody would have suffered mental
anguish had they undergone a similar experience. Of course, those who place a high
value on monogamous heterosexual marriage as an institution might be particularly
sympathetic towards the plaintiff.
The exposure to toxic substance/cancerphobia cases are different. Even if the
courts are satisfied with the subjective honesty of the plaintiffs’ claims that that they are
severely distressed by the fear of contracting cancer at some future date, there remains a
serious question as to whether or not they are overreacting. In fact, that rather clearly
appears to be the opinion of the court in Potter which stressed the obvious fact that
everybody is at risk of contracting cancer in the future from numerous sources, known
and unknown.95 In other words, the denial of the plaintiffs’ cause of action is similar to
the way that idiosyncratic plaintiffs are treated in a variety of cases.
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167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
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Id. at 838.
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24 Cal. Rptr.2d at 566 (asserting that “[a] carcinogenic or other toxic ingestion or exposure, without
more, does not provide a basis for fearing future physical injury or illness which the law is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. The fact that one is aware that he or she has ingested or been otherwise exposed
to a carcinogen or other toxin, without any regard to the nature, magnitude and proportion of the exposure
or its likely consequences, provides no meaningful basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of one's
fear. For example, nearly everybody is exposed to carcinogens which appear naturally in all types of foods.
Yet ordinary consumption of such foods is not substantially likely to result in cancer. (See Ames & Gold,
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In the offensive battery cases, for example, the plaintiff who takes offense at
being touched under circumstances in which most people would not is denied recovery,
except possibly upon proof that the defendant knew of his or her idiosyncrasy and chose
to exploit it.96 While it may be possible to explain these cases in terms of implied
consent (or “assumed consent”)—to say that one may be assumed to consent “to all those
ordinary contacts which are customary and reasonably necessary to the common
intercourse of life…,”97—“consent” seems to add little to the understanding of these
cases. Instead, it seems preferable to simply acknowledge that the genuineness of the
plaintiff’s claim is judged under an objective test. When one can claim to be offended, or
when one can claim to be distraught and entitled compensation because of it,98 is judged
by whether other reasonable persons would be similarly offended or distraught.
It is for this same reason that recovery for emotional distress has been permitted
by most courts in the HIV exposure cases.99 In those cases, the plaintiff, often a nurse or
other healthcare provider, has been negligently exposed to blood that might be infected
with HIV. Although medical advances have made HIV infection somewhat more

Too Many Rodent Carcinogens: Mitogenesis Increases Mutagenesis (1990) 249 Science 970, 971, fn. 10
[observing that apples, celery, coffee, carrots, cauliflower, grapes, honey, orange juice, potatoes and many
other common foods naturally produce carcinogenic pesticides that have been found to induce tumors when
administered to rodents in large doses].) Nor is the knowledge of such consumption likely to result in a
reasonable fear of cancer.”).
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Prosser & Keeton, supra note 26, § 9 at 42.
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v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003).
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See e.g. John & Jane Roes, 1-100 v. FHP, Inc., 985 P.2d 666, 668 n.9 (Hawaii 1999); Hartwig v. Oregon
Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1998); Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center, 923 P.2d
1154, 1163 (N.M. 1996).
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treatable and, therefore, less scary than it used be, at the time most of these cases were
decided, HIV infection was widely regarded as a death sentence. It hardly seems
surprising in those cases that there was no sense, expressed or felt, that the plaintiffs were
overreacting.100
To a somewhat lesser extent, the same sense that general damages for pain and
suffering—so-called “noneconomic damages”—lack the requisite objective verifiability
may provide at least a superficial justification for a legislatures’ determination to cap
non-economic damages at a fixed amount.101 This argument, of course, is only
defensible as an abstract proposition since an examination of the extent of intangible loss
suffered in many catastrophic injury cases makes it immediately apparent that the caps
frustrate any compensation or corrective justice goal. Nevertheless, if one starts with a
prejudice against litigation generally and with a distrust of plaintiffs (and their attorneys),
capping noneconomic compensatory damages can only be justified by pointing to the
difficulty of justifying a specific amount.102 More importantly, public willingness to
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Importantly, however, recent cases express the insistence on objective verifiability by formulation of
broad “no-duty” rules—precluding all suits in which the verifiability problem exists, rather than determine
its existence on a case-by-case basis.
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See Rustad, supra note 9 at 706-07 (“Tort reformers imply that pain and suffering damages are
frivolous, granted for phantom or imaginary pain. The common law, however, has always recognized the
compensability of mental or emotional distress. The common law did not place limitations on pain and
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tolerate (or endorse) such caps must be founded on the sense that the amount of
noneconomic damages claimed is simply not subject to objective verification.103.
4. Plaintiff’s Conduct Judged More Culpable than Defendant’s
a. Degrees of Culpability
No one disputes that, depending on the specific circumstances, there is a broad
range of judgments that can be rendered in assessing the “goodness” or “badness” of
human conduct. At one extreme, someone’s conduct may so nearly approach the social
ideal as to qualify the actor for public commendation. On the other hand, a person’s
conduct may be so bad—culpable, egregious and/or evil—that there would be general
agreement that it justly deserves condemnation. Of course, at both extremes and
everything in between, the circumstances under which one acts and the criteria of the
assessors must be taken into account. While such judgments may vary from place to
place and change over time, assessments of injury-causing conduct seem to be relatively
stable, changing only by degree. Thus, for example, while it is clear that drinking and
driving is now judged more harshly than it was only a few decades ago,104 it was never
thought to be less than negligent unless the intoxication was involuntary.105
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See Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Law and Culture 64-65 (2003)(“The caps legislation represents a
compromise on the issue of whether pain and suffering is a compensable ‘injury,’ implicitly recognizing
that it is but placing a limit on the degree of recognition. The statutory caps, which are themselves arbitrary
constraints on what critics of pain and suffering damages deem an essentially arbitrary award, represent a
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awards, across may cultures and through many centuries, that pain and suffering as a compensableloss is
embedded in the culture and that many people think that aawards in the missions twist the symbolism, if
not the reality, of pain too far for social comfort.”).
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See H. Laurence Ross, Social Control through Deterrence: Drinking and Driving Laws, 10 Ann. Rev.
of Soc. 21, 24 (1984)(describing the earlier “view, prevalent in legal circles, that drunk driving is ‘routine
and ordinary.’”); and Lewis P. Katz and Robert D. Sweeney, Jr., Ohio’s New Drunk Driving Law: A
Halfhearted Experiment in Deterrence, 34 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 239, 240 (1984)(asserting that “[t]he
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In any event, tort law expresses such judgments by decisions of whether to
impose liability and to a lesser extent in the size of the judgment for which a culpable
actor is responsible. Nevertheless, it is readily apparent that tort categories are, at best,
crude and imprecise instruments for expressing such assessments. Sometimes, it is
claimed, the categories are essentially meaningless. Thus, for example, whether a party’s
conduct was deemed “negligent” or “grossly negligent” has been said to carry no formal
legal consequence106—either was a sufficient basis for liability when used to characterize
the defendant’s conduct unless the plaintiff was also negligent or grossly negligent in
which case the claim was barred under the doctrine of contributory negligence.107 A
formal determination of “recklessness,” on the other hand, may be outcomedeterminative even though distinguishing it from gross negligence involves some
precision in definition that many courts have been unwilling or unable to articulate.108
Leaving aside, for the moment, the doctrinal importance of the “recklessness”
category, it is necessary to understand that an assessment of “negligent” conduct cannot
be made, in a vacuum. It is necessarily judged not only in light of the circumstances
this tolerant attitude, and enforced and administered by police, prosecutors and judges affected by a ‘there
but for the grace of God go I’ syndrome.”).
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See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 26, § 32 at 178 n.40 (“Involuntary, non-negligent intoxication, as
where the old lady who never has tasted whiskey is given a cup of ‘tea,” is held to be treated like illness or
physical disability.”).
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surrounding it,109 but also relative to other actors’ conduct. In other words, though often
not recognized, or at least explicitly articulated as part of the formal doctrine, one of the
circumstances that affect the assessment of the culpability of an actor’s conduct is the
other participants’ contributing conduct.110 The result is that it is not unusual to find that
liability will be imposed where the defendant’s conduct is deemed substantially more
culpable than the plaintiff’s, but not where the plaintiff is deemed to have been the more
culpable actor.
(1) Plaintiff’s Relative Culpability as a Bar – Pre-1960s
Prior to the widespread adoption of principles of comparative fault, a failure to
exercise sufficient care for one’s own safety was treated more harshly than a failure to
exercise care for another’s safety, at least when both types of conduct contributed to the
same loss. Although contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery was
undoubted tied up with proximate cause notions dealing with broken chains of
causation,111 it remained an absolute bar to recovery long after the notion of proximate
cause as objectively determinable chains of causation had been discredited.112
109

The so-called “emergency” doctrine, for example, reflects the recognition that conduct that would be
deemed negligent under one set of circumstances would not be considered negligent (or “as negligent”)
under another.
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The same relativity exists in judging criminal cases where the assessment of the defendant’s culpability
may turn, in whole or part, on the conduct of the victim. See Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An
Argument for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 385 (2005).
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See e.g. Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1191
(1986)(explaining that “[s]everal early doctrines worked to limit the temporal dimension. First, under the
traditional narrow view of causation, the negligence of the plaintiff could sever the connection between the
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See generally, Morton J. Horwitz, “The Doctrine of Objective Causation” in The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique 361 (David Kairys, ed., 1990).
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There is some old authority that barring recovery in cases where a plaintiff’s
misconduct was contributing was penal in nature.113 If this was the underlying
justification for the doctrine, it would lend some support to a claim that a failure to
protect oneself was deemed more egregious than a failure to protect another and the
greater culpability acted to preclude recovery. In any event, since one is inevitably a
foreseeable victim if one fails to exercise care for one’s own safety, issues concerning the
existence of a duty to oneself do not arise, though the inability to foresee harm to the
plaintiff might be put forth as a basis for exculpating a defendant.114
Notwithstanding the widespread adoption of contributory negligence, there were
both formal and informal mechanisms for permitting a negligent plaintiff to recover when
his or her misconduct was viewed as relatively minor in comparison with that of the
defendant. First, commentators have long maintained that, in cases where the trial court
did not find contributory negligence as a matter of law, juries often ignored the formal
legal doctrine of contributory negligence when the plaintiff’s conduct was viewed as
relatively less culpable.115 Second, under the doctrine of last clear chance, defendants
were required to pay negligent plaintiffs who had put themselves or their property in a
113

See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 26, § 65 at 452 (“It has been said that it has a penal basis, and that the
plaintiff is denied recovery to punish him for his own misconduct.”)(citing Wakelin v. London & S. W. R.
Co., 12 A.C. 41, 45 (1886)(Lord Halsbury)).
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See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); Also see Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and
Wrongdoing, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 407 (1987)(providing what is arguably the best explanation of the duty
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The extent to which such informal mechanisms limited the effect of the contributory negligence
doctrine is a matter of some disagreement. Compare Friedman, supra note 2 at 411-13 and Horwitz, supra
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Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 641, 665
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uncertainties in the law liberally in favor of those victims' opportunity to secure recoveries.”).
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position of danger when the circumstances were such that the defendant still had the
opportunity to avoid the accident.116 That this represents an assessment of the relative
culpability of the parties is even more clear in those jurisdictions that distinguished
between “conscious” and “unconscious” last clear chance. In cases where the defendant
consciously discovered the negligent plaintiff’s plight and still failed to avoid hurting him
or her, there was clearly a higher level of fault that justified the imposition of liability—
overcoming, as it were, the normal judgment that a failure to protect oneself was more
serious.
Under South Dakota law, the idea that contributory negligence is to be a complete
bar except in cases where the plaintiff’s negligence is “slight” in comparison to the
“gross” negligence of the defendant or defendants was formalized by statute.117 In cases
presenting the need for decision under the “last clear chance” doctrine, the relative fault
of the plaintiff will be assessed in light of whether the defendant knew of his peril and
had the opportunity to avoid the harm. Thus, for example, in Good Low v. United
States,118 a tribal police officer speeding though a field searching for a fleeing suspect
was deemed negligent, but not grossly negligent in comparison to the plaintiff, since
“there is no evidence that…[the officer] actually discovered that Good Low was in his
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See generally, Prosser & Keeton, supra note 26, § 66 at 462-68 and G. Edward White, Tort Law in
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428 F.3d 1126 (8th Cir. 2005)(S.D. law).
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path…[until he] was only a few feet away from Good Low and could not stop his vehicle
before striking him.”119
(2) Plaintiff’s Relative Culpability as a Bar—Post-1970s
In one sense, the judicial and legislative move away from contributory negligence
in the 1960s and 1970s in favor of the formal adoption of comparative negligence served
to formalize the informal practices which preceded it. Of course, given that many of the
informal exceptions to the rule of contributory negligence required juries to ignore or
defy the court’s instructions, the doctrinal change undoubtedly resulted in much greater
consistency in the application of the rules.
Even after comparative negligence replaced contributory negligence in most
places, a majority of those states that adopted comparative negligence continued to
penalize the highly culpable plaintiff by instituting systems of modified comparative
negligence that denied the plaintiff any recovery in cases where, depending on the
particular scheme adopted, his or her fault was deemed to be either equal to or greater
than that of the defendant. Only about a dozen states opted for a pure comparative
negligence system under which a highly culpable plaintiff could demand payment from a
less culpable defendant.120
One might have thought that the adoption of comparative negligence signaled the
beginning of an era in which comparative fault principles—that a defendant whose
negligence in any degree would be liable to the plaintiff in some amount, albeit short of
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Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Development of Comparative Negligence Doctrine Having
Application to Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339 (1977)(providing a state-by-state
breakdown).
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full compensation—would become dominant in tort doctrine. This, however, has not
occurred, at least to the extent one might have anticipated. In fact, much of the post1970s tort reform efforts seem to be directed toward ensuring that the highly culpable
plaintiff be barred from any recovery.
Thus, for example, the federal “Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform
Act of 1996,” a bill that was prevented from becoming law only by President Clinton’s
veto, contains a provision making the plaintiff’s intoxication a complete defense provided
that, as a result of the intoxication, the “claimant…was more than 50 percent responsible
for such [harm causing] accident or other event.”121 The Conference Report explains:
Both H.R. 956 and the Senate amendment provide a complete defense to a
product liability action in situations in which a claimant, under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, is more than fifty percent responsible—as a
result of such influence—for the accident or event resulting in the harm he
or she sustains. A society that seeks to discourage alcohol and drug abuse
should not allow individuals to collect damages when their disregard of
such an important societal norm is the primary cause of accidents or
events.122
Some state tort reform legislation contains similar provisions.123 The general
attitude, neatly summed up in a Pennsylvania case, is that a demand for compensation for
harm caused largely by the plaintiff’s own serious misconduct is a display of
“unmitigated temerity.”124
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The identical principles can be seen in cases involving bartenders. Though since
modified by the legislature, at one time New Mexico law provided:
No person who was sold or served alcoholic beverages while intoxicated
shall be entitled to collect any damages or obtain any other relief against
the licensee who sold or served the alcoholic beverages unless the licensee
is determined to have acted with gross negligence and reckless disregard
for the safety of the person who purchased or was served the alcoholic
beverages.125
Cases, however, had interpreted legislation so as to allow a third party user of the
highway who was injured by an intoxicated motorist to maintain an action against a
bartender based on negligence in serving the intoxicated motorist to the point of
impairment.126 Explaining the rationale for this law, in Sanchez v. San Juan Concrete
Co.,127 the court stated:
What is the basis for the balance struck in the…[legislation]? Why is a
third party injured by the patron’s intoxication permitted to recover for the
tavernkeeper’s simple negligence whereas the patron cannot? The
tavernkeeper is equally culpable in either circumstance—the same
conduct, serving an intoxicated patron, is involved in each. The injury to
the patron is no less foreseeable than injury to the third party: it is
probably more foreseeable. The reason for the distinction between the
patron and the third party is simply the reprehensibleness of the patron’s
conduct.128
While many of the cases of egregious misconduct involve drug or alcohol
consumption, a finding that the plaintiff’s conduct is sufficiently culpable to preclude
or probable results ‘would savor too much of allowing…[such a] person to benefit by his or her own
wrongful act.” (quoting Buntin v. Hutton, 1917 WL 2452 *3 (Ill. App. 1917)).
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Id. at 576 (also noting that “the statute finds it even more distasteful to forbid recovery when the tavern
keeper is particularly culpable—having “acted with gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety”
of the patron.”).
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recovery is not so limited—almost any truly stupid behavior will do.129 Thus, in cases
where plaintiffs attempted to lower themselves by means of “old worn rope,”130 dived
into obviously shallow water,131 placed their hands into spinning lawn mower blades132 or
used volatile chemicals in an attempt to clean up a mess created by the defendant,133
courts have had little problem in concluding that the plaintiffs’ conduct was the sole
proximate cause of the harm sustained.
III. The Right Not to be Sued
To this point, the discussion has focused on when it appears inappropriate for an
injured plaintiff to assert a claim against another who would be legally responsible but for
the conduct of the plaintiff leading up to the loss or based on common perceptions
regarding his or her decision to sue. In other words, the legal responsibility of the
defendant has been treated as a given. Additionally, while this Article’s primary focus is
on how perceptions of individuals’ conduct affects doctrine, many other values are
reflected in the doctrine as well. Thus, the importance of individual autonomy is seen in
the principle of nonfeasance immunity and, to the extent that private property rights are
viewed as an integral part of autonomy,134 in the immunity of occupiers of land from suit
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by trespassers.135 Against that background, however, judgments regarding conduct play a
major role in the determination of liability rules.
The first set of conduct-related values, of course, is simply the flip side of the
social values that bar the plaintiff in cases where his or her accident-causing conduct is
viewed as highly culpable. The defendant’s conduct must be perceived to be sufficiently
culpable relative to the plaintiff’s or other actor’s conduct before he or she will be
deemed to merit the sanction of tort liability. For the most part, this not only precludes
the possibility of strict liability,136 but also tends to preclude liability where the level of
the defendant’s culpability, relatively speaking, is low.
A. Background Context
1. No Liability without Fault
The debate over strict liability in America stretches back into the 19th Century.
English common law had developed principles of liability without fault that were applied
in a limited number of cases involving creators of private nuisances, keepers of harmcausing wild animals, trespassing cattle, and a few others. During the latter part of the
19th Century, led by such influential scholars and judges as Charles Doe, Lemuel Shaw
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, strict liability was widely rejected and American tort law
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See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 26, § 58 at 395 (explaining that the basis for the immunity is “that, in
a civilization based on private ownership, it is considered a socially desirable policy to allow a person to
use his own land in his own way, without the burden of watching for and protecting those who come there
without permission or right.”).
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Strict liability can still be found primarily in cases involving vicarious liability and under workers’
compensation legislation. Why these forms of liability without fault have escaped the condemnation
heaped upon other forms of strict liability is beyond the scope of this Article.
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assumed its current form generally requiring, as it does, that liability be predicated on
fault.137
Nevertheless, there remained what have been commonly described as “pockets”
of strict liability within a system which was predominantly fault-based. Sellers of
substandard goods could be held liable for breach of warranty, even if the substandard
nature of the goods was not detectable by the seller; those who interfered with other’s use
and enjoyment of realty (private nuisance) or other’s right of exclusive possession of
realty (trespass) could be held liable without fault; those who caused harm as a
consequence of engaging in “ultra-hazardous” or “abnormally dangerous” activities138
were strictly liable, and so on.
During the 1960s, breach of implied warranty was recrafted into strict liability for
defective products139 and, for a time, it appeared that liability without fault might become
the new model of tort liability. As has been extensively chronicled elsewhere, however,
there was a strong anti-strict liability reaction to this development. Although the
language of strict liability is often retained,140 a majority of states have now rejected strict
liability in cases where it is alleged that a harm-causing product was defective by reason
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Compare Restatement of Torts, § 520 (1938)(“ultrahazardous”) and Restatement (Second) of Torts, §
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of its design or because it lacked any or adequate warnings of danger or instructions for
safe usage. Although in theory strict products liability remained the rule in cases where a
product was mismanufactured, in realty, this added little, if anything, to the old
negligence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which either permitted an inference of negligence
or created a presumption of negligence in the manufacture of such products.141 The
American Law Institute’s adoption of the Products Liability Restatement in 1998 largely
completed the return to negligence,142 though a handful of states remain holdouts.143
The rejection of strict liability in tort for defective products went beyond merely
reversing the trend in tort law that started with Roger Traynor’s opinion in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products144 in 1963 and the ALI’s adoption of section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts in 1964, but cut the heart out of its underpinnings as well. In
141

The products liability version of res ipsa is set forth in Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
§ 3 (1998) which provides:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product
defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific defect, when
the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product
defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.
Id.
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See e.g. Soule v. General Motors Corp., 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 607, 617 (Cal. 1994)(allowing for the
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1145, 1159 (Md. 2002)(retaining consumer expectation test); Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139
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Perhaps, somewhat more accurately, with Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
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promulgating 402A, William Prosser, the Reporter to the Second Restatement, and his
advisors, relied heavily upon the pre-existing warranty strict liability as it had developed.
Recently, many courts, supported by the Products Liability Restatement, have taken the
position that, at least in design and warning cases, warranty liability, like “strict liability”
under the Restatement, is dependent upon a finding of negligence.145
Although, in theory, strict liability for “ultra-hazardous activities,” or “abnormally
dangerous” activities has been accepted in most states, the approach taken by the Second
Restatement of Torts largely blurred the distinction between strict liability and
negligence. While section 519 purports to provide for strict liability, section 520 defines
“abnormally dangerous activity” by reference to a six factor balancing test that is similar
(though not identical) to a traditional negligence test.146 Even so, at least some courts
have displayed reluctance to utilize even the limited type of “strict liability” identified in
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But see Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 254-55 (N.Y. 1995)(distinguishing warranty
liability from products/negligence liability ).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 520 (1977) provides:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
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sections 519 and 520.147 Private nuisance was recast as an intentional tort, at least in the
sense that the tortfeasor continued the activity that interfered with another’s interest after
receiving notice that the interference was occurring.148 In short, the views of those who
saw fault or culpability as an essential precondition for the imposition of tort liability
have clearly prevailed.149
Those opposing strict liability have made three distinctly different types of
arguments to support their position. The first is a political or public policy argument
focusing on the alleged negative economic effects of liability without fault. Briefly
stated, it is simply claimed that adopting strict liability means that defendants (commonly
corporations) will have to pay for more injury costs than they would under a negligence
regime. This serves to increase their cost of doing business either directly, by making
them absorb the costs, or indirectly, by increasing the cost of liability insurance. Given
global competition and given that other countries may not have adopted strict liability,
American companies, it is claimed, are put at a competitive disadvantage.150 If one
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See e.g. Dan Quayle, President’s Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in
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accepts this claim, the tort system generally, and strict liability in particular, can be
blamed for factory closures, lost jobs, trade deficits, refusals to market vaccines and other
drugs, and so on.
The second argument focuses on the moral implications of the first. If a factory
closes, either by going out of business or by moving its operations to another country, the
greatest hardship will be felt by the now-unemployed workers who will find themselves
without salaries, health benefits, pensions, etc. Even if the company is able to remain in
business by raising the prices for the goods or services it produces, the poorest people
will hardest hit by the higher prices.151 Thus, the strict liability system, at least partly
intended to provide compensation for injury to those least able to afford it, is portrayed as
a system harmful to the most vulnerable.152
companies. In a survey of over 250 American companies, more than three-quarters of
the executives said they believe that the United States will be increasingly disadvantaged
in world markets unless modifications are made in the liability system.
Id. at 980.
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See e.g. Rychlak, supra note 34 at 49 (arguing the tort system increases unemployment and poverty).
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The form of argument is simply a variation of the one lampooned by the late Arthur Leff. He wrote:
There is this old widow, see, with six children. It is December and the weather is rotten.
She defaults on the mortgage on her (and her babies’) family home. The mortgagee,
twirling his black moustache, takes the requisite legal steps to foreclose the mortgage and
throw them all out into the cold. She pleads her total poverty to the judge. Rising behind
the bench, the judge points her and her brood out into the swirling blizzard. “Go,” he
says. “Your plight moves me not.” “How awful,” you say?
“Nonsense,” says the economic analyst. “If the old lady and kids slip out into the storm,
they most likely won’t die. *** Moreover, look at the other side of the (you should
pardon the expression) coin. What would happen if the judge let the old lady stay on just
because she was out of money? First of all, lenders would in the future be loathe to lend
to old widows with children. I don’t say that they wouldn’t lend at all; they’d just be
more careful about marginal cases, and raise the price of credit for the less marginal
cases. The aggregate cost to the class of old ladies with homesteads would most likely
rise much more than the cost imposed on this particular widow. That is, the aggregate
value of all their homes…would fall, and they’d all be worse off.

***
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The third argument appeals somewhat more directly to societal values and a
particular conception of morality. It is an unfair and unjustified invasion of the
defendant’s property rights, it is claimed, to take money from one person to compensate
another for the harm caused by the first, simply on the basis of causation. Fairness,
individual autonomy and respect for property rights demand that the redistribution of
wealth can only be justified by the culpability of the defendant coupled with the
defendant having caused the harm.153 In other words, the argument is based on a direct
invocation of a corrective justice rationale for the tort system under which both
culpability and causality are required and where the payment of damages by a wrongdoer
to his victim is viewed as a means of “annulling” the wrong.154
2. The Religious Right
A similar corrective justice underpinning for the obligation to compensate for
unintended harm is asserted by the Christian right. Ronald Rychlak, discussing the
concept of monetary damages paid by the wrongdoer to the victim to make him or her
whole, explains:

More and more of them would be priced out of the money market until no widow could
ever decide for herself to mortgage her house to get the capital necessary to start a
seamstress business to pull herself (and her infants) out of poverty. What do you mean,
‘awful’? What have you got against widows and orphans?”
Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451, 46061 (1974).
He also noted the importance of pointing out “the non-freeness of lunches.” Id. at 461.
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Rychlak, supra note 34 at 24.

See e.g. Weinrib, supra note 114 at 440 (“ The plaintiff’s right to be free of wrongful interferences with
his person and property is correlative to the duty on the defendant to abstain from such interferences. The
plaintiff’s suffering of a wrongful loss is the foundation of his claim against the person who has inflicted
that loss. The transference from the defendant to the plaintiff of a sum quantifying the loss is the procedure
for annulling the effects of a wrong done by the former to the latter.”)
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This concept has an extensive history, going back as far as the Old
Testament legal codes contained in the book of Exodus. For example,
Exodus 21 and 22 contain parameters for the compensation of both
individuals who have been injured and the violations of personal property.
The lex talionis, or law of retribution, is famously contained in the
phrases: “life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe” (Exodus 21:23-25
NAB). The general principle behind this law is one of reciprocity, which
holds that the punishment or restitution for the wrong is to be appropriate
linked to the extent of the harm or damage.155
Not only is corrective (“commutative”) justice critically important, but it is
asserted to be more important than distributive justice. Again, as explained by Rychlak:
The reason why commutative justice is so important in Catholic doctrine
is that it most clearly impacts individuals, not just the State. Commutative
justice “requires safeguarding property rights, paying debts, and fulfilling
obligations freely contracted.” Assurance that the State will enforce these
rights helps shape the expectations and attitudes of the citizens in a way
that lead to the proper functioning of the State. In this way, “Distributive
justice is possible only upon the foundation of commutative justice….
[C]ommutative justice is not only fundamental, but is also prior to
distributive justice.”156
Thus, to the extent that liability without fault is based on principles of distributive
justice, it follows that it must necessarily be subordinate to a system of fault-based
liability.
B. No Liability without Sufficient Fault Relative to Others
Not only has strict liability been largely rejected as a basis for imposing an
obligation on a defendant to pay for another’s injury, but low-level culpability has also
been largely rejected. As previously noted, of course, often this is true in cases where a
plaintiff’s culpability is deemed to be greater than the defendant’s. However, it is also
155
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Rychlak supra note 34 at 8-9.

Id. at 14 (quoting the Catechism of the Catholic Church 2411 and Stephen J. Grabill, Kevin E.
Schmiesing and Gloria L. Zuniga, Doing Justice to Justice: Competing Frameworks of Interpretation in
Christian Social Ethics, vol. 4, Christian Social Thought Series 40-41 (2002)).
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true where a defendant’s culpability appears relatively minor when compared to that of
some third party. It is the insistence on this outcome that explains the continued viability
of old proximate cause analysis, notwithstanding modifications of other tort doctrine.157
In the 1960s and 1970s, it appeared as though apportionment of responsibility
principles would largely replace the all or nothing tort doctrine of earlier years.
Contributory negligence was replaced by comparative negligence in all but a few states.
Joint and several liability, under which each liable defendant, regardless of percentage of
fault, could be held for the full amount of the judgment,158 was abrogated in many states
by the adoption of rules that a defendant was only liable for the percentage of the
judgment equal to the percentage of responsibility assigned by the trier of fact.159 Old
implied indemnity rules, which allowed a “passively” negligent tortfeasor to shift the loss
in its entirety to an “actively” negligent tortfeasor, were replaced by comparative
contribution principles.160
Nevertheless, neither courts nor legislatures have shown any particular inclination
to reject old proximate cause rules that allow an admittedly negligent defendant to escape
all liability because of the intervening culpable misconduct of the plaintiff or a third
person. This is not to say that such a change has not been proposed. Commentators have
157
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noted the doctrine’s anomalous presence notwithstanding the apparent doctrinal shift
toward percentage apportionment.161 Yet, only Connecticut has abandoned superseding
cause and, even there, retained the doctrine in cases of intervening criminal
misbehavior.162
The continued viability of proximate cause principles serve to preclude recovery
in its entirety when the relative culpability of the actors is perceived to demand that
outcome, even though the application of formal comparative fault doctrine would seem to
require apportionment. Moreover, given that voluntary intoxication—particularly illicit
drug use—increasingly has come to be regarded as truly egregious misbehavior, it is not
surprising to find a series of decisions in a variety of contexts where the intoxicated
misbehavior of either the plaintiff or a third party serves to exculpate a negligent
defendant.
Consider, for example, the court’s treatment of a manufacturer’s liability in Butz
v. Lynch.163 In that case, the defendant Testor was the manufacturer of an aerosol
airbrush that sprayed paint using a liquid propellant. Lynch intentionally inhaled the
product to get high, lost control of his automobile and struck Butz, killing himself and
injuring her.
Testor began distributing the product in 1990. The court explained:
Plaintiffs asserted that Testor was on notice that a secondary market for its
product had developed among young people who intentionally inhaled the
161
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53
product for the purpose of experiencing an intoxicating-like effect. They
further alleged that Testor knew about an additive, oil of mustard, a
chemical found in horseradish, which could have prevented or made it
unlikely that anyone would have intentionally abused the product.
However, plaintiffs claimed, Testor unreasonably waited until 1996 (the
year after this accident occurred) to modify the product to add oil of
mustard to deter the practice of “huffing” the product.164
Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff might have made out a plausible
negligence case against Testor based on evidence that the defendant had known for years
that its product was being misused and could have remedied the problem inexpensively,
the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the appellate court
affirmed concluding that “Testor's knowledge of the potential and actual intentional
abuse of its product does not create a question of fact on the question of reasonably
anticipated use [under the Louisiana products liability statute].”165
Under virtually identical facts, an Ohio appellate court upheld summary judgment
in favor of an airbrush manufacturer finding, as a matter of law, that the manufacturer’s
conduct was not a proximate cause of the harm to an innocent user of the highway in
light of the intentional intoxication by another.166 Interestingly, the court also dismissed
the plaintiff’s claim against the owners of the home where the intoxicant was inhaled
finding that social hosts owed no duty to users of the highway injured by intoxicated
guests and an Ohio exception to the social host rule for minors inapplicable on the
facts.167
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The law dealing with social host liability also serves to illustrate the principle that
liability will not be imposed on actors whose conduct is viewed as less culpable than that
of another who participated in causing the harm. Moreover, the treatment of social host
liability over a period of time tends to demonstrate the relative long-term stability of
social conceptions of responsibility. For the better part of the 20th Century, the cases
reflect that those who served alcohol to others were not considered responsible for
injuries to consumers of the intoxicants in cases where they were injured or killed.168 In
Fleckner v. Dione,169 the court stated: “‘it has been uniformly held, in the absence of
statute to the contrary, that the sale of intoxicating liquor is not the proximate cause of
injuries subsequently received by the purchaser because of his intoxication.’”170 The
same proximate cause rationale was used to deny recovery against the server to strangers
injured by the intoxicated person.171
Although the enactment of Dram Shop laws in many states during the late 19th
and early 20th Centuries often provided a basis for suit against commercial sellers,
“[e]ven when an act's language was broad enough to include social hosts, courts confined
liability to tavern owners.”172
For a period of time, primarily during the 1970s and 1980s, judicial decisions in a
number of states held, applying the traditional principle that a duty is owed to foreseeable
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victims of one’s conduct, that a negligent social host might be held liable to strangers
injured by intoxicated adult social guests.173 Nevertheless, the judicial attempt to expand
liability met with notable resistance. In California and New Jersey, decisions allowing
social host liability were either abrogated or modified by the state legislatures174 and a
number of courts, sometimes praising the idea, ultimately chose to defer to the
legislature.175
Explaining these decisions, the drafters of the proposed Third Restatement of
Torts assert:
In deciding whether to adopt a no-duty rule, courts often rely on general
social norms of responsibility. For example, many courts have held that
commercial establishments that serve alcoholic beverages have a duty to
use reasonable care to avoid injury to others who might be injured by an
intoxicated customer, but that social hosts do not have a similar duty to
those who might be injured by their guests. Courts often justify this
distinction by referring to commonly held social norms about
responsibility. The rule stated in this Section does not endorse or reject
this particular set of rules. It does support a court's deciding this issue as a
categorical matter under the rubric of duty, and a court's articulating
general social norms of responsibility as the basis for this
determination.176
In cases where the culpability of the defendant is greater however, the imposition
of liability on the social host is common. Thus, in cases involving the provision of
alcohol to minors who, thereafter, injure others, courts have little problem expressing the
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social judgment of misconduct through the imposition of liability.177 The same is true
where the social host’s conduct is otherwise particularly egregious.178 Though precisely
how such conduct should be characterized remains a problem.
C. Misconduct-Based Liability Rules
1. The Meaning of “Negligence”
Among legal scholars, there has long been a debate regarding the proper
conception of “negligence.” The law and economics scholars and many others who, to a
greater or lesser extent, have been influenced by their work tend to conceptualize
negligence in terms of the economic rationality of a cost-benefit or risk-utility test.179
Such balancing tests are also widely employed by professional decisionmakers, both
within private industry and within governmental regulatory agencies.180 Nevertheless, as
Richard Wright has pointed out, such tests are “infrequently mentioned by the courts,
almost never included in jury instructions, rarely actually employed in judicial opinions,
and almost never explain[] the actual results reached by the courts.”181 Instead, juries are
typically instructed, rather generally, in terms of “reasonableness”182 and, as all first year
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law students learn, “reasonableness” is defined by reference to the conduct of the
(somewhat idealized) norms of behavior of ordinary persons within the relevant
community. Whether that is actually the commonly held understanding of the term, at
least outside of the legal community, however, may be open to doubt. In fact, the more
common lay understanding of “negligence” would appear to require either “rule
breaking” or some other type of misconduct that lawyers and academics might be
inclined to characterize as something other than “mere” negligence.
a. Rule-Breaking Misconduct
Perhaps the most common lay understanding of “negligence” focuses on conduct
where a party has broken a published rule regarding behavior. While this includes the
non-compliance with published industry standards and administrative rules and
regulations, most commonly people are exposed to the situation where the conduct
alleged to be tortuous violated a criminal statute or similar positive enactment. This is
not particularly surprising. After all, motor vehicle accidents are probably the most
common basis for tort suits183 and those cases very commonly involve negligence per se
person’s conduct in a given circumstance doesn’t measure up to the conduct of an ordinarily prudent and
careful person, then that person was negligent. On the other hand, if the person’s conduct does measure up
to the conduct of a reasonably prudent and careful person, the person wasn’t negligent.”
Also see, e.g. Cal. BAJI 3.10 (2006)(“Negligence is the doing of something which a reasonably
prudent person would not do, or the failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do,
under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. It is the failure to use ordinary or reasonable
care. Ordinary or reasonable care is that care which persons of ordinary prudence would use in order to
avoid injury to themselves or others under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.”).
183

See e.g. Thomas A. Eaton and Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in Georgia and
Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 627, 651 (1996)(concluding “[t]he mix of claim types found in
these [five] Georgia counties is in keeping with national data. The BJS Tort Cases in Large Counties study
found that the composite urban tort docket is dominated by automobile accident cases (60.1% of all tort
claims), followed by premises liability (17.3%), medical malpractice (4.9%) and products liability (3.4%).
While the four-county Georgia data reveal a comparatively greater dominance of automobile accident
claims than does the BJS study, the relative ranking of claim types is the same.”); Thomas A. Eaton,
Susette M. Talarico and Richard E. Dunn, Another Brick in the Wall: An Empirical Look at Georgia Tort
Litigation in the 1990s, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1049, 1070-71 (2000)(in a follow-up to the earlier study, the authors
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based on the violation of some criminal law regulating the use of the highways—right of
way at an intersection, safe distances between cars, speed and, of course, prohibitions on
drunk driving among others.
Although lawyers understand the idea that judges are adopting legislatively
determined standards of behavior and applying those standards in a civil case to which
they do not directly apply,184 it is certainly understandable that non-lawyers would simply
view the rule breaking or illegality of the behavior as the critical issue.
Trial judges, of course, necessarily recognize that jurors—who are undoubtedly
pretty representative of the public as a whole in this regard—will conflate rule breaking
or criminality with negligence. Thus, in cases where a statute or other law has been
violated, but the court concludes that the statutory standard is not an appropriate one for
use in a civil case, judges often will exclude evidence of a party’s violation of statute,
since allowing the jury to hear of it would almost inevitably lead to confusion and be
unduly prejudicial to the violator,185 even if the evidence might be probative on some
other issue.186

concluded that “[h]igh stakes products liability and medical malpractice suits receive more media and
academic attention, but the everyday world of tort litigation is dominated by the automobile accident. We
found this to be true in our 1996 study, and it remains true today.”).
184

See Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (Cal. 1948)(explaining “[t]he decision as to what the civil
standard should be still rests with the court, and the standard formulated by a legislative body in a police
regulation or criminal statute becomes the standard to determine civil liability only because the court
accepts it. In the absence of such a standard the case goes to the jury, which must determine whether the
defendant has acted as a reasonably prudent man would act in similar circumstances. The jury then has the
burden of deciding not only what the facts are but what the unformulated standard is of reasonable conduct.
When a legislative body has generalized a standard from the experience of the community and prohibits
conduct that is likely to cause harm, the court accepts the formulated standards and applies them.”)
(Traynor, J.).
185

See e.g. Minichello v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 756 F.2d 26, 30 (6th Cir. 1981)(improper admission of
OSHA standards in a products liability cases was prejudicial); Trimarco v. Klein, 451 N.Y.S.2d 52, 57
(N.Y. 1982)(finding that the statute in question was not binding on the defendant, the court asserted that
although it was relevant to the custom of using safety glass for bath enclosures, “defendants’ objection to
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The popular tendency to equate negligence and the violation of criminal statutes
and administrative regulations, i.e. negligence and negligence per se, is important for two
reasons. First, it makes it quite easy to accept the converse, i.e. due care per se. Even
though traditional tort doctrine has long held that compliance with a statutory or
regulatory requirement is not dispositive on the issue of negligence187 (though it is
admissible to prove non-negligence), it is not difficult to understand why those who
already believe there is no negligence without the violation of a rule readily accept that
proof of no violation equals proof of no negligence. And, in fact, the so-called “statutory
compliance” defense has not been a hard sell for the tort reformers.188

the statutes themselves should have been sustained. Without belaboring the point, it cannot be said that the
statutes, once injected into the adversarial conflict, did not prejudice the defendants.”).
186

Evidence of a statutory requirement, for example, might tend to prove community custom even if the
violation of the statute is not negligence per se. See e.g. Trimarco v. Klein, supra note 185.
187

See e.g. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 733-34 (Minn. 1980)(compliance with
flammability standards set forth in federal legislation did not preclude liability for compensatory or
punitive damages); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Or. 1978)(noting that “[w]e have
found no cases holding that compliance is a complete defense.”); But see Judge Linde’s concurring opinion
in Wilson explaining:
It is true that compliance with government safety standards will generally not be held to
negate a claim of “dangerously defective” design, but it would equally be an
oversimplification to say that it can never do so. The role of such compliance should
logically depend on whether the goal to be achieved by the particular government
standards, the balance struck between safety and its costs, has been set higher or lower
than that set by the rules governing the producer’s civil liability. It may well be that
when government intervenes in the product market to set safety standards, it often
confines itself to demanding only minimum safeguards against the most flagrant hazards,
well below the contemporary standards for civil liability. But that was not necessarily the
case when the first safety standards were legislated, and it is not necessarily so for all
products today.
Id. at 1333 (Linde, J. concurring).
188

See e.g. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-403(1)(b); Ind. Code § 34-20-5-1(2); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 603304(a); Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 600-2946(4); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-4; Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-104;
Utah Stat. § 78-15-6(3).
Interestingly, the creation of a presumption that a complying product or presumption of non-negligence
seems to add nothing to traditional doctrine since the plaintiff already has the purden of proof on these
issues—though it will ensure that evidence of compliance is admissible.

60
Second, the mistaken idea that negligence necessarily, or at least often, involves
criminal behavior may lead to the additional unwarranted conclusion that some level of
immorality must be associated with the conduct before liability will be imposed, and this
view is not limited to traffic accidents. A number of empirical studies, for example,
appear to indicate that there is a widely held sense among physicians that negligence
involves an element of willfulness that distinguishes it from other accidentally caused
injuries.189 Malpractice attorney and Professor Darrell Keith explains:
Many physicians believe medical “negligence” means “gross
malpractice,” solely a breach of “medical customary practices,” departures
from medical practices of “most,” “an average of,” other,” or a
“consensus” of physicians, or “guilt” or “sinfulness.” Still other doctors
like to think “to err is human,” thereby considering almost all medical
errors to “honest mistakes in judgment,” “a legitimate mistake,” or
“natural mistake,” or “understandable errors,” or “unavoidable error. In
the minds of some medical professionals, all of medicine involves
“medical judgment” because it is purportedly an inexact science with too
many variables.190
If, in fact, many physicians—and by extension, many people—distinguish
between inadvertent error caused by momentary lapse of attention and some type of
conduct involving morally deficient misconduct, believing the latter is required to
establish liability for negligence or professional negligence, it would go a long way
toward explaining not only the outraged response of physicians to malpractice
allegations,191 the fact that roughly three out of four jury verdicts in medical malpractice
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See e.g. Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case Study of an
Anesthesiology Department, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 121, 128 (1997).

190

Darrell L. Keith, Medical Expert Testimony in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 Baylor L. Rev. 1,
36 (1991).
191

See e.g. Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice
Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York at 9-67 (Report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study
to the State of New York 1990)(reporting that “most physicians perceive their suits as arising from
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cases favor the physician,192 but also the common judicial and legislative tendency to
require something more than “mere” negligence as the basis of liability in a number of
different types of cases.193 This tendency might simply be a conscious or unconscious
attempt to bring formal doctrine into line with common understanding.
2. Aggravated Misconduct
While it may well be true that, as Anthony Sebok has stated, “recklessness has…
become an increasingly important means of expressing society’s outrage at a certain form
of antisocial conduct[,]”194 the formal judicial or legislative adoption of an aggravated
misconduct standard as the basis of liability is nothing new. In many types of cases
where immunities have been created to protect underlying autonomy, to reflect some
social intuition regarding responsibility, or to preclude plaintiffs from recovering because
of their conduct, it has not been uncommon for courts and legislatures to carve out an
exception to the applicable immunity or no-duty rule applicable upon a showing that the
defendant’s conduct was something more than merely negligent. As the drafters of the
proposed Restatement explain:
[I]n physical-harm cases the defendant's negligence generally serves as a
sufficient basis for liability. Yet there are particular situations in which
courts and legislatures have concluded that the negligence standard would
circumstances beyond their control. Many physicians report that they are being unfairly and unjustly
punished….”), quoted in W. John Thomas, The Medical Malpractice “Crisis”: A Critical Reexamination of
a Public Debate, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 459, 501 n.295 (1992); William M. Sage, Principles, Pragmatism, and
Medical Injury, 286 J.A.M.A. 226 (2001)(reporting that physicians attached “moral opprobrium” to
allegations of malpractice).
192

See William P. Gunnar, Is There An Acceptable Answer to Rising Malpractice Premiums?, 13 Annals
Health L. 465, 479 (2004)(jury verdicts favor plaintiffs in 28% of cases tried to verdict); Frank A. Sloan
and Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 Law
& Soc’y Rev. 997, 1007 (1990)(22-44% of verdicts for plaintiffs).
193
194

See infra text at notes 198-216.

Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)’s Definition of
Intent, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1165, 1185 (2001).
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operate too harshly on defendants or would entail inappropriate social
results. When courts or legislatures do reach such a conclusion, they
frequently establish recklessness as the appropriate standard of liability.195
Although, to some extent, the meaning of this legislative or judicial approach is
dependent on the definition of “recklessness,” a matter about which there is considerable
disagreement,196 the truth of the essential point is indisputable. A determination that the
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Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, § 2 cmt. b (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005)(internal
cross reference omitted).
196

The Second Restatement of Torts, § 500 (1965), defines “reckless disregard of safety” as follows:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or
intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk
is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.

The proposed Third Restatement, § 2 on the other hand, states:
A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if:
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that make
the risk obvious to another in the person's situation, and
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens that are so
slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the person's failure to adopt the
precaution a demonstration of the person's indifference to the risk.
Explaining the change, comment c states, in part, as follows:
Section 2 both acknowledges appropriate differences between criminal recklessness and
tort recklessness and also sets forth a standard for recklessness that is somewhat more
restrictive than that included in the previous § 500. Under the latter, an actor can be found
reckless whose only fault consists of the failure to draw an inference that a reasonable
person would have drawn. Yet that fault is too limited and too ordinary to justify a
finding of recklessness. This Section accordingly requires that the person either have
knowledge of the danger or have knowledge of facts that would make the danger obvious
to anyone in the actor's situation.
Rather than formally adopting either a “very negligent” approach or a “knowledge” approach, many courts
attempt to rely on various verbal formulations seeking to express the actor’s culpability either in
quantitative or qualitative terms. Descriptions such as “gross negligence,” “willful,” and/or “wanton,” in
addition to or in place of “recklessness” are common. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical Harm, § 2 cmt. a. (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005). Also see Sebok, supra note 194 (critically discussing the
Third Restatement’s approach).
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defendant’s conduct was “morally deficient”197 will provide a basis for imposing liability
notwithstanding the existence of many of those circumstances, described earlier, which
have otherwise led courts or legislatures to formulate rules which either preclude the
plaintiff from suing based on perceptions regarding his or her conduct or which protect a
defendant based on insufficient relative culpability.
Thus, for example, in the express assumption of risk cases,198 while it is often
possible to agree in advance not to hold a defendant liable for negligence, courts have
been unwilling to honor advance agreements to exculpate another for reckless or
intentional misconduct. In such cases, courts either hold that such agreements violate
public policy199 or, as a factual matter, that the agreements themselves do not encompass
reckless or intentional misconduct.200 In the primary assumption of risk cases,
recklessness is considered outside of the scope of the risk that a plaintiff has tacitly
agreed to encounter as evidenced by participation in the risky activity.201
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Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physicial Harm, § 2 cmt. c. (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005).

198

See supra text at notes 40-50.

199

See supra text at notes 40-42.

200

See e.g. Barber v. Eastern Karting Co., 673 A.2d 744, 753 (Md. App. 1996)(W.Va. law)(explaining “a
general clause in a pre-injury exculpatory agreement or anticipatory release purporting to exempt a
defendant from all liability from any future loss or damage will not be construed to include the loss or
damage resulting from the defendant's intentional or reckless misconduct or gross negligence, unless the
circumstances clearly indicate that such was the plaintiff's intention. Similarly, a general clause in an
exculpatory agreement or anticipatory release exempting the defendant from all liability for any future
negligence will not be construed to include intentional or reckless misconduct or gross negligence, unless
such intention clearly appears from the circumstances.”).
201

See Knight v. Jewett, 11 Cal. Rptr.2d 2, 16 (Cal. 1992)(explaining that “[t]he overwhelming majority of
the cases, both within and outside California, that have addressed the issue of coparticipant liability in such
a sport, have concluded that it is improper to hold a sports participant liable to a coparticipant for ordinary
careless conduct committed during the sport—for example, for an injury resulting from a carelessly thrown
ball or bat during a baseball game—and that liability properly may be imposed on a participant only when
he or she intentionally injures another player or engages in reckless conduct that is totally outside the range
of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.”).
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In the “gratitude” cases,202 courts and legislators apparently sense that the
disqualification from suing only goes so far. For example, the old “guest passenger”
statutes precluded suit by a non-paying automobile passenger against a negligent driver,
but permitted suit if the conduct rose to the level of some form of aggravated
misconduct—willful, wanton misconduct, gross negligence, recklessness or the like.203
Similarly, “Good Samaritan” legislation precludes suit against volunteering health care
professionals only in the absence of a showing of some type of misconduct that was more
than simply negligent.204 Modern versions of similar legislation follow the same pattern.
Thus, North Carolina’s food donor immunity contains an exception for injuries “caused
by the gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct of the donor”205 and the
immunity of the nonprofit itself is limited in the same way.206 Similarly, the Volunteer
Protection Act of 1997, which immunizes volunteers from negligence-based liability
under many circumstances, abrogates the immunity where the harm is caused by “willful
or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant
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See supra text at notes 76-85..

203

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, § 2 cmt. b (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005)
(“[A]utomobile guest statutes and common-law guest doctrines, although no longer common, still exist in
some some form in certain jurisdictions. The require the social guest in in the defendant’s car to establish
something more than negligence in order to justify liability.”
204

Id. (“Under statutes in effect in almost every jurisdiction, such a physician [who provides emergency
services] is free of liability for ordinary negligence; to justify liability, the plaintiff must show (depending
on the jurisdiction) that the physician was guilty of gross negligence or recklessness, or willful and wanton
misconduct, or that the physician failed to act in good faith.”).
205

N.C. Gen. Stats. § 99-10(a).

206

N.C. Gen. Stats. § 99-10(b).
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indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer[.]”207
Moreover, the Act specifically allows for liability for misconduct that:
(A) constitutes a crime of violence…or act of international terrorism…for
which the defendant has been convicted in any court;
(B) constitutes a hate crime…;
(C) involves a sexual offense…for which the defendant has been
convicted in any court;
(D) involves misconduct for which the defendant has been found to have
violated a Federal or State civil rights law; or
(E) where the defendant was under the influence…of intoxicating alcohol
or any drug at the time of the misconduct.208
Particularly in cases where the right to sue or the right not to be sued hinges on
the relative culpability of the parties, the characterization of an actor’s conduct may prove
important. An otherwise negligent defendant may successfully defend on the basis of
proximate cause where the plaintiff’s or a third party’s conduct is extreme to the point
where courts are inclined to label it “unforeseeable,”209 though it is rare that it need be
formally characterized as “reckless.”210
Similarly, in many of the cases where no-duty rules based on social value
norms—protection of individual autonomy, for example—would otherwise preclude suit,
extreme misbehavior has emerged as the standard of liability. These cases include, but
are not limited to, those where the no-duty rule is based on the longstanding judicial
207

42 U.S.C.A. § 14503 (a)(3).

208

42 U.S.C.A. § 14503 (f)(1)(internal cross references defining terms omitted).
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See supra text at notes 129-133 and notes 166-171.
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See e.g. Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 647 A.2d 841, 848 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1994)(“[Victim’s] flagrant
disregard for personal safety by crossing Parkway late at night…constitute[s] intervening superseding
cause[].”), rev’d 669 A.2d 1378 (N.J. 1996).
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insistence on the “protection of property rights.”211 Thus, the rule of no duty to
trespassers, based on the importance accorded to real property and the value of rights of
exclusive possession, not only allows landowners to be held liable for intentionally or
recklessly injuring trespassers,212 but also recognizes a duty to trespassing children,213
discovered trespassers214 and, in some states, frequent adult trespassers.215 In the latter
cases, the occupier’s culpable misconduct will not necessarily be characterized as
“reckless” under either the Second or proposed Third Restatement definitions.216

211

See Wells, supra note 11 at 740-41 (identifying this as one of the aspects of traditional tort law
explainable by reference to broadly held social values).
212

Prosser and Keeton, supra note 26, § 58 at 397 (explaining “[a] trespasser, while he may be a
wrongdoer, is not an aoutlaw, and an intentional, unprivileged battery upon him was too much to be
tolerated even by the great veaneration of the English courts for rights in land. The defendant was not
permitted to set traps for the trespasser, or to use unreasonable force to expel him from the premises. Nor,
in later cases, was he allowed to injure him negligently by an act specifically directed toward him, or
recklessly by conduct in conscious disregard of his peril.”).

213

Id., § 59 at 399-410.

214

Id., § 58, at 396-97.

215

Id., at 395-96.

216

See e.g. Alexander v. Medical Associates Clinic, 646 N.W.2d 74, 79-80 (Iowa 2002)(finding duty of
reasonable care to discovered trespassers); Nelson v. Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 845 N.E.2d
884, 889 (Ill. App. 2006)(holding “where the landowner is aware of the presence of frequent trespassers
and a corresponding risk of danger to them, the frequent trespass doctrine imposes a duty of care on him to
prevent harm.”).
On the other hand, in some cases courts have required conduct that seems to satisfy the proposed Third
Restatement definition of recklessness as a condition of imposing liability, but have not formally
announced a “recklessness” standard. For example, many jurisdictions immunize pharmacists from
liability when a patient is injured by drugs prescribed by a physician. This no-duty rule is often justified by
the claim that the imposition of a duty would have the potential to interfere with the relationship between
the prescribing physician and the his or her patient. Nevertheless, even where immunity is recognized, an
exception is carved out in cases where the pharmacist either had knowledge of a particular risk or almost
certainly should have had such knowledge. Thus, where the pharmacist knew the customer was an
alcoholic and that the drug prescribed was dangerous when mixed with alcohol, a duty was found.
Similarly, where multiple drugs are prescribed and it is well-known among pharmacists that it is dangerous
to take them in combination, the pharmacist cannot simply stick his head in the sand and still avoid
liability. In other words, regardless of the court’s characterization of the pharmacist’s behavior under such
circumstances, it is a recklessness standard that is being applied. Immunity may exist where there was even
an unreasonable failure or refusal to investigate, however, the pharmacist is not free to ignore the facts in
front of his or her eyes.
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Cases that involve the voluntary consumption of intoxicants—drugs or alcohol—
may represent a special, distinctive type of morally deficient egregious misconduct that,
while not falling neatly within the negligence-recklessness doctrinal distinction,217 is
commonly treated as reckless with corresponding legal consequences. Although for a
brief period of time during the 1950s and 1960s the idea of alcoholism as a disease led to
at least some changes in criminal law,218 similar changes in tort law are not readily
apparent. In any event, by the 1970s, public attitudes toward drinking and driving had
hardened with the result that courts were not only willing to preclude recovery by
intoxicated plaintiffs, cut off the liability of negligent defendants when intoxicated third
persons played a causal role in bringing about harm, but to impose punitive damages on
intoxicated defendants as well.219
What is important to note, for purposes of this Article, however, is that none of
these cases represent any particular change in doctrine. Apparently, the moral intuition
of the community both before and after the brief liberation of tort law during the 1960s
and 1970s, has been to insist on the assumption of sole personal responsibility by those
whose conduct is exceptionally culpable.
217

There are, of course, many reasons why bad conduct following voluntary intoxication will not fit into
attempts to define “recklessness” (or, for that matter “negligence”). Given the well-known addictive
potential of various intoxicants, whether or to what extent consumption should even be viewed as
“voluntary” is open to debate. Even if we assume that the intoxication is sufficiently voluntary,
intoxication itself is not a tort. It is not until the intoxicated person chooses to drive, operate machinery, or
the like, that the conduct becomes even potentially relevant in a tort case. To that, one must also consider
the tort requirement that the combination of intoxication and the activity need to be casually linked to the
harm.
218

The American Psychiatric Association classified alcoholism as a disease in 1952. See American
Psychiatric Association Comm. On Nomenclature and Statistics, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual—
Mental Disorders, at vi, 88 (1952). Also see generally, Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law:
An Opinionated Review, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 943, 955-58 (1999).
219

Generally see Danny R. Veilleux, Annot., Intoxication of Automobile Driver as Basis for Awarding
Punitive Damages, 33 A.L.R.5th 303 (1995).
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IV. The Translation of Moral Social Intuition
Into Tort Doctrine
The idea that widespread public intuition is—or at least can be—the substance
from which tort doctrine is formulated is hardly novel. The insight that tort law mirrors
our culture is one that Marshall Shapo has explained and explored in books and journal
articles dating back at least to the early 1990s.220 In his most recent work on the
subject,221 he explains the judicial implementation of instrumentalist strict products
liability doctrine of the 1960s and 1970s as a part of that ongoing process. “[I]t is
reasonable to conclude,” he argues, “that the idea that there should be liability without
fault for injuries caused by dangerously defective products was responsive to an
underlying set of economic and social realities, relecting the culture that derived its
identity from those realities.”222
Yet, there is another explanation that appears better to fit the historical record.
Throughout much—maybe most—of the 20th Century, tort law undoubtedly did reflect
mainstream American culture. Something happened, however, during the 1960s and
1970s which interrupted the process—either momentarily halting it in its tracks or, at the
very least, distorting the mirror’s image.
There are two aspects to the obvious explanation, one more significant that the
other. First, as Shapo and other have recognized and acknowledged over the years, the
filtering of the culture through the lens of a judiciary, that is not particularly
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See Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us About the
American Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1567 (1995); Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability and the
Search for Justice (1993).
221

Shapo, Tort Law and Culture, supra note 103.

222

Id. at 283.
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representative of society as a whole, has, at the very least, the potential to distort the
reflection.223 Second, and more importantly, what if the development of tort law during
the 1960s and 1970s was characterized by a judicial tendency not to even attempt to
reflect popular culture, but was based on a set of values that was largely out of touch with
the mainstream?
In 1992, Michael Wells, explicating and applying earlier work by Bruce
Ackerman, challenged what had become the conventional approach of tort theorists
toward assessing where tort law was and where it was going. 224 He explained:
My argument will make heavy use of a distinction, introduced by
Professor Bruce Ackerman, between two styles of reasoning in addressing
legal issues. One is the perspective of the “Ordinary Observer,” who
begins his analysis by looking at the common practices of laymen and
makes legal rules based on the expectations of a well-socialized member
of society, without regard to whether the resulting body of law fits into
any coherent pattern. Ackerman contrasts this method with that of the
“Scientific Policymaker,” who begins from the premise that the law
should serve some goal or small group of goals and who views
adjudication as an exercise in crafting rules that will help to realize those
goals. I maintain that traditional tort law better fits the model of the
Ordinary Observer, while the new regime in torts is largely the product of
Scientific Policymaking.225
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It is for this reason that I argued elsewhere that judicial rule-making power should be reduced, leaving
the decisions in most tort cases to the civil jury. See Martin A. Kotler, Social Norms and Judicial
Rulemaking: Commitment to Political Process and the Basis of Tort Law, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 65 (2000).
Nevertheless, while Shapo acknowledges that, “judges experiences and their decisions in socially
controversial cases will often tend to reflect those backgrounds and experiences[,]” recognizes that judicial
decisions may embody “a set of biases associated with its creation by a predominantly male, white, affluent
class of decisionmakers” and the possibility that “judges seeking to move up on the judicial career track
will likely write opinions with an eye to how their decisions may be regarded by those in a position to
advance them—who often will share the bias just described[,]” he insists not only that judges “try to hold
their political predilections in check” but also “as a group tend generally to reflect the perspectives of the
broader society….” Shapo, Tort Law and Culture, supra note 103 at 289-90.
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Wells, supra note 11 (basing his argument on the distinction made in Bruce A. Ackerman, Private
Property and the Constitution 10-20 (1977)).
225

Id. at 727-28.
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Under the general heading of “Scientific Policymaking” (in a torts context) fall all
of the major theoretical constructs that drove the development of torts in the 1960s and
1970s. It included all forms of the instrumentalism—regardless of whether the goals
were social welfare, economic efficiency (wealth maximization), utility maximization,
accident cost reduction, individual autonomy, or something else. Academic tort theory
dictated judicial decisionmaking as much as (if not more) than before or since. The entire
strict liability experiment arose out of it; it was not a product of the moral social intuition
of the time and that, by itself, condemned it to eventual rejection together with a host of
other legal doctrines that failed to resonate with the general public. While judges may
have formally served as lawmakers, all too often they were acting as surrogates for
academicians. As G. Edward White explained:
This study has suggested…that doctrinal changes in tort law have to an
important extent been created by academicians. The influence of
academics on tort law has ranged from direct and immediate examples
(appellate court use of the Restatement of Torts, a treatise or a law review
article as the source of a standard or test of liability) to a more indirect and
long-range ones (the evolution of an extracted “principle” of tort law to
prominent doctrinal status in the courts). But academic influence has been
regular and profound, shaping basic conceptions of civil liability. To say
that academic who propound theories, create doctrines, or extract
principles of tort law are not functioning as lawmakers is to equate
lawmaking solely with the status of officials charged with that task.226
V. Conclusion
Once one accepts that tort law was and is widely regarded as essentially punitive,
the rejection of much of the doctrine that was developed during the 1960s and 1970s is
not only not surprising, but was almost inevitable. While the values tort law has reflected
traditionally were certainly not universally held, they are apparently very widely held and
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White, supra note 116 at 241-42.
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have been for a long time. The mere fact that they may be based on a lack of
understanding of what many of us accept as basic legal principles does not really matter;
the underlying beliefs are held firmly nonetheless. That liability without fault or without
sufficient fault relative to others is perceived to be unfair to defendants; that highly
culpable plaintiffs should be barred from recovery as should those who are otherwise
deemed to have forfeited any claim to call upon society for redress is simply a reflection
of those values.
The campaign to roll back the tort law of the 1960s and 1970s, as many have
noted, is deliberately orchestrated and lavishly funded by those who have the most to
gain by its success.227 This, of course, should come as no surprise to anybody. Like all
political campaigns, it is at times wildly misleading—rife with half-truths and some outand-out lies. Nevertheless, it is an elitist mistake to view the attractiveness of tort reform
solely in terms of a cynical manipulation of a gullible public. Much of it is consistent
with the widespread public rejection of the idea that accidents are inevitable. Rightly or
wrongly, many believe not only can they be avoided, but also, if they are not, it may well
be a matter of the victim’s personal responsibility. Many reject the idea that accident
costs should be spread, and insist that the imposition of liability can be nothing other than
a public determination of significant moral deficiency. Moreover, conduct evidencing
greed, ingratitude and overreaction or exaggeration of one’s injury should serve to close
the courthouse doors.
The post-1970s reemergence of conservative Christians as a political force
championing free enterprise, sanctity of contract, property rights, personal responsibility
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and some kinds of personal freedom may well have been a significant factor in the
rollback of the liberalization of tort law, but most of the values they endorse (at least
those relevant to the tort reform debate) have been widely shared for most of the 20th
Century. In that sense, the developments of the 1960s and 1970s were the aberration.

